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ABSTRACT 
Since the early sixties a great controversy has centred in the 
curriculum world on the so-called 'disciplines thesis' of Philip H. 
Phenix and Paul H. Hirst. This thesis proposes that all knowledge can 
be reduced to a small number of logically distinct 'domains' or 
'disciplines', and therefore all human meaning and understanding can 
be examined in terms of these 'forms' or 'realms'. 
Hirst contends there are seven or eight logically distinct 
forms: history, ethics, mathematics, physical science, religion, 
philosophy, social science and the arts, while Phenix contends there 
are nine. Phenix's 'realms' are symbolics, empirics, esthetics (sic), 
synnoetics, ethics and synoptics, six in number, achieved by combining 
his normative and comprehensive classes of meaning into two rather than 
five 'realms'. 
This theory of knowledge is intended by Hirst to provide a 
'bridge' of reason between the human mind and the 'real' world. Phenix 
intends it to break down the feelings of fragmentation, cynicism, 
meaninglessness and inadequacy in the face of the surfeit of knowledge 
confronting the members of modern industrialized communities. 
The 'disciplines thesis' Hirst and Phenix put forward though 
is far from being one about which they are in complete harmonious 
accord. Hirst is severely critical of several of Phenix's 'realms', 
particularly symbolics, synnoetics and synoptics. 
In trying to 'tidy up' Phenix's theory, Hirst has not reached 
a height from which his own ideas are above criticism. However, he 
has certainly clarified many of the central issues regarding the 
philosophical foundations of the curriculum, and made a powerful case 
for the continuance of 'liberal education' as an indispensable part 
of the school curriculum. 
The implications for the curriculum of Hirst and Phenix are 
many. To begin with the ways of knowing contained in the 'forms' or 
'realms' should be a vital part of the teaching of all school subjects, 
whether those subjects are pure 'forms' or 'realms', or 'fields' 
combining aspects of several of the cognitive domains. In addition 
careful consideration should be given to logical, developmental, 
methodological and motivational factors in the teaching of the 
disciplines so that at all times the following four basic principles 
are observed. 
(I) The sequence of study should be such that the material to be 
studied is introduced in a coherent, logically progressive way, 
there being no single way of 'putting together the pieces in the 
jigsaw.' 
(2) All human beings progress through certain clearly definable 
periods of growth and these determine what we are capable of 
learning. 
(3) The distinct ways of structuring experience in each of the 
disciplines are as important as the actual content of a subject. 
(4) Without an appeal to the imagination pupils will not be motivated 
to learn. 
CHAPTER I 
A STUDY OF PAUL H. HIRST'S 'LIBERAL EDUCATION 
AND THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE'. 
1 
In his introduction to his proposals on 'Liberal Education and 
the Nature of Knowledge' Hirst seeks to define what a liberal education 
is, though it is easier for him to define what it is not. 
Whatever else a liberal education is, it is not a 
vocational education, not an exclusively scientific 
education and not a specialist education in any sense. 1 
He sees it as being an education 
based fairly and squarely on the nature of knowledge 
itself, a concept central to the discussion of education 
at any leve1. 2 
He then proceeds to explore the original Greek concept of a liberal 
education and a typical modern attempt to define, justify and develop 
a liberal education curriculum, the Harvard Committee Report, 'General 
Education in a Free Society', published in 1945. 
Hirst's Explication of the Greek Notion of Liberal Education  
The fully developed Greek notion Hirst explains was rooted in 
a number of related philosophical doctrines about mind, knowledge and 
reality: firstly about the significance of knowledge for the mind, and 
secondly about the relationship between knowledge and reality. 
In summary he explains that the first set of doctrines concerned 
the peculiar and distinctive activity of the human mind, which because 
of its very nature, pursues knowledge. Th2 achievement of knowledge 
satisfies and fulfils the mind which thus attains its own appropriate 
end. Pursuit of knowledge is thus the pursuit of the good of the mind 
and therefore an essential element in the good life. In addition the 
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achievement of knowledge was the chief means to the good life as a whole. 
Since mind is man's essential distinguishing characteristic it is in 
terms of knowledge that his whole life was considered to be rightly 
directed. 
That knowledge was equal to the task was guaranteed by the second 
group of doctrines. These asserted that the mind, through the right 
use of reason, comes to apprehend what is ultimately real. Thus life 
and thought could be given perspective by knowledge that corresponds 
to what is ultimately real. Further, the way in which reason attains 
knowledge results in a view of the whole of man's understanding as 
hierarchically structured in various levels. 
From the knowledge of mere particulars to that of pure being 
all knowledge had its place in a comprehensive and harmonious scheme, 
whose pattern was formed as knowledge was developed to understand 
reality in all its many forms. 
Thus there emerged the idea that liberal education was a process 
concerned simply and directly with the pursuit of knowledge. However, 
for Hirst the doctrines already mentioned give to this general idea 
particular meaning and significance. He contends that they lead to 
a clear definition of a liberal education's scope and content and to 
a clear justification for education in these terms. The definition 
he says is clear because education is determined in range, structure 
and content by the forms of knowledge themselves and their harmonious, 
hierarchical interrelations. A liberal education'he feels does not 
need to be justified in terms of utility or morality. 
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He sees the doctrines as lending three justifications to this 
concept of education: 
(1) Such a liberal education is based on what is true and not on 
uncertain beliefs or temporary values; 
(2) Knowledge itself is a distinctive human value as the fulfilment 
of the mind; 
(3) The significance of knowledge for the Greek concept of 'the good 
life' as a whole predetermines that the liberal education is 
important to man's understanding of how he ought to live, both 
individually and socially. 
Thus Hirst sees the Greek concept of liberal education as an 
education to free the mind, free reason from error and illusion and 
free man's conduct from being wrong. From this, he explains, has arisen 
an educational curriculum theoretically free from 'the predilections 
of pupils, the demands of society or the whims of politicians'. 3 This 
was behind the Greek development of the seven liberal arts, an 
introduction to the forms of knowledge as then perceived. Since then 
educational theoreticians have aimed at a similar 'cultivation and 
development of the mind in the full range of man's understanding.
4 
Hirst and a Typical Modern Statement: The Harvard Committee Report 
Hirst vigorously questions the Harvard Committee's Report. He 
poses the question whether those who do not believe in a metaphysical 
concept of reality or in reality based on knowledge can legitimately 
subscribe to this concept of education. Historically liberal education 
4 
was couched in a Greek philosophical framework. Yet, he explains, the 
Harvard Committee Report tries to develop a concept of liberal 
education independent of such metaphysical realism. 
Hirst undermines the report by showing how, because a liberal 
education seeks development of the mind in terms of what is external 
to it, the structure and pattern of reality, then by questioning the 
relationship between mind, knowledge and reality 'the whole harmonious 
structure is likely to disintegrate. 5 
He goes on to challenge the Report's lack of definition. A 
liberal education defined solely in terms of knowledge only becomes 
acceptable if knowledge is thought to be developing the mind in 
desirable ways. If doubt is cast on the functions of knowledge then 
liberal education must be redefined explicitly stating the qualities 
of mind and moral virtues to which it is directed. 
If knowledge is not understanding of reality, but of experience 
then what is to replace the hierarchical scheme of knowledge that gave 
pattern and order to education, he asks? 
Having challenged the problem of the Committee's lack of 
definition Hirst goes on to examine the important question of 
justification. If knowledge is not rooted in reality or if its 
significance for the mind and 'the good life' are questioned, then what 
is the justification of a liberal education in terms of knowledge alone? 
Hirst concludes that 
adequate definition and justification are not only 
dependent on the classical [Greek] doctrines but can be 
based directly on an explication of the concepts of 
'mind' and 'knowledge' and their relationships. 6 
The Harvard Committee Report attempted a definition of liberal 
education in two ways: 
(a) The qualities of mind it ought to produce; 
(b) The forms of knowledge with which it should be concerned. 
Hirst challenges these because the precise relationship between (a) 
and (b) is not made clear. It is asserted that they are 'images of 
each other
a 
yet that liberal education looks to 'the good man in 
society and is dictated by the nature of knowledge itself: 8 
Three areas of knowledge are determined i n the Report, primarily 
by their distinctive methods: 
(i) The Natural Sciences 
(ii) The Humanities 
(iii) Social Studies 
However, it is 'cultivation of certain aptitudes and attitudes 
of mind' that is being aimed at, the elements of knowledge being the 
means for developing these. In other words, according to the Report's 
logic liberal education is primarily concerned with (a) above. 
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The 'aptitudes of mind' in the Report are fourfold: 
(1) To think effectively; 
(2) To communicate thought; 
(3) To make relevant judgements; 
(4) To discriminate among values. 
Hirst questions how these aptitudes come to be developed by the 
three types of knowledge as little is said about it. The Report notes 
that the three phases of (1) above correspond to the three divisions 
of learning, (i), (ii) and (iii) mentioned previously, and notes the 
difficult connection between education in the making of value 
judgements and the formation of moral character. Otherwise he says 
its remarks are general, emphasizing these qualities should be 
consciously developed in all studies and generalized as far as 
possible. 
Hirst attacks the Report at this point because he feels 
the notion that a liberal education can be directly 
characterized in terms of mental abilities without fully 
specifying the forms of knowledge involved is false. 
He says this is because of a misunderstanding by the Committee of the 
way in which mental abilities are distinguishable. As an example he 
quotes what the Report had to say about effective thinking (that is 
that there can only be effective thinking when an outcome can be 
recognized by those that have the appropriate skills and knowledge). 
Hirst believes that description and evaluation of liberal 
education must be in terms of public language with public criteria to 
do this. None of the four aptitudes of mind mentioned previously can 
6 
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be delineated he feels except by means of their detailed public 
features. He criticizes the Committee's approach because he considers 
it is simply illustrative. No account of liberal education is possible, 
he contends, without a full account in terms of the public features 
of the forms of knowledge with which it is concerned. Secondly he 
criticizes the Committee's statement because 'the use of broad, general 
terms for these abilities serves in fact to unify misleading, quite 
disparate achievements. 110  
He uses as an example the fact that 'communication' in the 
sciences has only certain very basic features in common with 
'communication' in poetic terms. It is only when the abilities are 
fully divided in terms of the various domains of knowledge that he feels 
it is at all clear what is involved in developing them. He therefore 
compares 'effective thinking' to 'successful games playing'; it is a 
too nebulous, general and impractical definition. Thus, for Hirst it 
is vitally important to realize the objective differences that there 
are in forms of knowledge and therefore in our understanding of mental 
processes that are related to these. 
In his final criticism of the Report he attacks it for including 
under the heading 'liberal education' such things as emotional and 
moral development in the generalized notion of education. Liberal 
education then ceases to be one defined directly in terms of the pursuit 
of knowledge and thus cannot be justified by justifying that pursuit. 
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A Reassertion and a Reinterpretation  
A logically consistent concept of liberal education must be 
worked out for Hirst (on logical grounds) in terms of the forms of 
knowledge. This is of crucial concern, he feels. 
By 'forms of knowledge' he does not mean content but 'the complex 
ways of understanding experience which man has achieved through 
learning . 
11 
Each form of knowledge he contends involves the 
development of creative imagination, judgement, thinking, 
communicative skills and so on in ways that are unique as ways of 
understanding experience. To list these elements draws attention for 
Hirst to the many features that a liberal education must include. To 
state 'the development of effective thinking' is only pertinent if it 
is explained in terms of the forms of knowledge which give it meaning 
such as 'in terms of solving problems in Euclidean Geometry' or 'coming 
to understand the poetry of John Donne'. 
To be told that liberal education is concerned with certain 
specified forms of knowledge, the essential characteristics of which 
are then detailed explicitly as far as possible, he maintains is to 
be given a clear understanding of the concept and one which is 
unambiguous as to the forms of thinking, judgement, imagination and 
communication it involves. He gives A.D.C. Peterson's definition in 
the Gulbenkian Foundation Report, Arts and Science Sides in the Sixth  
Form, as a much closer definition of a liberal education then the 
Harvard Committee's Report. 
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Peterson avoids the term 'knowledge' to be 'free of any claims 
of distortion or bias' and develops the concept as one 'that develops 
the intellect in as many as possible of the main modes of thinking' .12 
Peterson's 'modes of thinking' concept is greatly developed by 
Hirst. He identifies four parallel forms of mental development which 
can only be distinguished, in the last analysis, in terms 
of the public features that demarcate the areas of 
knowledge on which they stand.' 13 
He proposes that the logical, empirical, moral and aesthetic 
forms of understanding are distinct from each other only by their 
distinctive concepts and expressions and their criteria for 
distinguishing the true from the false and the morally good from the 
bad. In this he suggests a new 'harmony' in a logical relationship 
between the concept of 'mind' and the concept of 'knowledge'. Thus 
he considers the achievement of knowledge involves the development of 
mind, that is the self-conscious, rational mind of man. 
To have a rational mind implies for Hirst experience structured 
under some sort of conceptual scheme. He considers that manifestations 
of consciousness are intelligible by means of a conceptual apparatus. 
Further, whatever private awareness there may be, it is by public 
symbols he believes that concepts are articulated. 
As the symbols derived from experience can be used to examine 
subsequent experience he explains assertions are possible which are 
testable. There are thus public criteria. It is by the use of such 
tests that for Hirst the concept of knowledge arises. Knowledge arises 
'from the formulating and testing of symbolic expressions ... which 
1.0 
are held for public sharing.
.14 
It is within the cognitive framework 
of these public criteria that he sees the life of man being patterned 
and ordered. Without it he considers everything would be 
unintelligible. 
Knowledge can only be understood in terms of the objective 
features with which it can be associated. Thus for Hirst the forms 
of knowledge are the basic articulations whereby the whole of 
experience has become intelligible to man. 'They are the fundamental 
achievement of mind. .15 
Since the mind is not an organ with its own inbuilt forms of 
operation the distinctions between the various forms Hirst bases 
entirely on their particular conceptual, logical and methodological 
features. 
The justification of a liberal education is thus in terms of 
the nature of knowledge. The different forms have different 
conceptual, logical and methodological categorizations. Therefore the 
achievement of knowledge is the development of mind to encompass this 
'trinity' of distinctive features for each distinct 'form' of 
knowledge. This, Hirst maintains, leads to a justification which must 
be made in terms of publicly rooted concepts and be assessable in terms 
of acceptable criteria. 16 These two principles are fundamental to the 
pursuit of knowledge in all its forms. Therefore the forms are the 
working out of the principles in particular ways. 
Justification of any kind of knowledge he considers therefore 
involves using the principles in one specific form to assess their use 
U 
in another. Any activity can thus be examined for its rational 
character and for its adherence to these principles and is thus 
justified on the assumption of them. Justification outside the use 
of Hirst's two key principles he feels is logically impossible. The 
circularity of justification that is implied here he explains is the 
result of the inter-relation between the concepts of rational 
justification and the pursuit of knowledge. He therefore concludes 
that 'in a very real sense liberal education is the ultimate form of 
education.
'17 Despite the absence of any metaphysical doctrine about 
reality Hirst's concept of liberal education closely parallels the 
original Greek concept. It is an education which is directly concerned 
with the development of the mind through rational knowledge in 
whichever form that may be. 
This Hirstian concept of liberal education has, like the 
original Greek concept objectivity. It is a necessary feature of 
knowledge that there be public criteria for distinguishing between true 
and false good and bad, right and wrong. It is the existence of these 
criteria which Hirst explains give knowledge its objectivity. This 
in turn gives objectivity to liberal education, an education that 
aspires to free the mind from error and illusion. 
Further, the determination of 'the good life' is by pursuit of 
rational knowledge in which actions are justified by giving reasons. 
Therefore, the forms of knowledge are directly concerned with moral 
understanding. 
Thus the concept of liberal education as a whole Hirst shows 
is given a justification in its importance for the moral life. This 
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is not a distinct significance but a necessary consequence of what the 
pursuit of knowledge entails. 
What Hirst Considers to be the Basic Philosophical Considerations for 
Liberal Education  
At this point in the development of his argument Hirst asks the 
question 'What are the implications of this for the practical conduct 
of education?' He first tries to distinguish the various forms of 
knowledge and then tries to relate them to the organisation of the 
school curriculum. 
He defines a form of knowledge as 'a distinct way in which our 
experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public 
symbols.
'18 
Since the symbols have public meaning he maintains their 
use is testable against experience and there is the progressive 
development of series upon series of tested symbolic expressions. 
Hirst's forms begin in the various low level developments within 
our knowledge of the everyday world. From this he perceives their 
extension into the developed forms as being natural. In these developed 
forms he identifies four related distinguishing features: 
(1) They each involve certain central concepts that are 'peculiar' 
to that 'form'. For example, gravity, photosynthesis and hydrogen 
are concepts in the sciences. Numbers and matrices involve 
mathematics whilst God and predestination involve religion. 
(2) In a given form of knowledge these and other concepts form a 
network of possible relationships in which experience can be 
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understood. As a result the 'form' has a distinct logical 
structure. For example, the terms and statements of mechanics 
and historical explanations can only be understood in certain 
strictly limited ways. 
(3) The 'form' has expressions or statements that are testable against 
experience such as in science, moral knowledge and the arts, 
though in the arts the number of questions is explicit and the 
criteria for the tests are only partially expressible in words, 
and thus are limited by the peculiarities of the form. 
(4) The 'forms' have developed particular techniques and skills for 
exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions. 
The symbolically expressed knowledge of the arts and sciences 
illustrates this. 
Despite these four ways of distinguishing forms of knowledge 
this is not the limit to their explication, he feels. All knowledge 
involves the use of symbols and the making of judgements in ways that 
can only be learnt by tradition. He gives as examples the art of 
scientific investigation, the development of appropriate experimental 
tests, the forming of an historical explanation, the assessment of 
truth and the appreciation of a poem. 
The acquisition of these 'forms' therefore he maintains 
logically cannot be fully realised in (solitary) isolation but must 
be learnt from a 'master' of the form, hence the terms 'discipline', 
'disciple', and so on. The dividing lines between the 'disciplines', 
he contends cannot be easily drawn. The central feature is that they 
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can be distinguished by their dependence on some particular kind of 
test against experience for their particular expressions. 
The sciences he argues depend crucially on empirical, 
experimental and observational tests. Mathematics depends on 
deductive demonstrations from certain set axioms. Moral knowledge and 
the arts involve distinct forms of critical tests, though these and 
the ways in which they are applied are only partially statable. Because 
of their particular logical features Hirst also classifies historical 
knowledge, religious knowledge and the human sciences as distinct 
disciplines. 
Within these areas Hirst argues for making further 
distinctions. These are because groups of knowledge have centred on 
a number of related concepts or around particular skill s or techniques. 
Finally Hirst sets out his last three important classifications 
of knowledge: 
(a) Those organisations of knowledge which are not themselves 
disciplines or subdivisions of a discipline, but complexes of 
knowledge from several disciplines. Hirst calls these 'fields 
of knowledge' •19 	They are not concerned with developing a 
particular, unique structuring of experience and include such 
'fields' as geography, engineering and curriculum study. 
(b) Whilst for Hirst moral knowledge is a distinct form he feel s no 
specialized subdivisions have been formed. 	He maintains 
political, legal and educational theory contain elements of moral 
knowledge and are about the best examples of this genre. 
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(c) He identifies certain 'second order' forms of knowledge which are 
dependent on the other 'primary' areas. For example, scientific 
studies of language, philosophical studies of meaning and 
justification would all seem to constitute distinct disciplines 
by virtue of their particular concepts and criteria of judgement 
in Hirst's view. 
In summary, therefore, the Hirstian curriculum consists of a 
'liberal education' in three principal areas: 
(I) Forms of knowledge (subdivisible): mathematics, the physical 
sciences, history and the human sciences, religious study, 
literature and the fine arts, and philosophy. 
(2) Fields of knowledge: theoretical and practical (may or may not 
include elements of moral knowledge). 
(3) Moral knowledge: how to behave in practical situations. 
Hirst's Views on the Planning and Practical Conduct of Liberal  
Education  
Hirst does not see liberal education syllabuses and curricula 
simply in terms of knowledge and skills. He feels they should be 
constructed to introduce pupils to the interrelated aspects of each 
of the basic forms of knowledge and each of the several disciplines. 
He considers they must be constructed to cover the range of knowledge 
as a whole selecting material which is neither encyclopaedic nor too 
specialized. 
What is being sought is, first, sufficient immersion in 
the concepts, logic and criteria of the discipline for 
a person to know the distinctive way in which it 'works' 
by pursuing these in particular cases; and then 
sufficient generalisation of these over the whole range 
of the discipline so that his experience begins to be 
widely structured in this distinctive manner. 2° 
Hirst feels that the goal of independent, rational thinking can 
only come from an education where the distinctive patterns of thinking 
have been taught instead of unrelated, questionable knowledge based 
on facts but not on processes. 
It is this 'coming to look at things in a certain way .21 that 
he believes should be aimed at, not minute particulars (such as the 
dates of all the kings and queens of England or the table of chemical 
elements or atomic weights). Beyond this he feels an outline of the 
major achievements in each area will provide some grasp of the range 
and scope of experience that has thus become intelligible (for example 
critical appreciation in the literary arts.) 
His liberal education curriculum includes some indication of 
the areas of overlap between the forms, particularly in the practical 
fields. This is most important, he feels, in moral education as he 
sees moral understanding as requiring the widest possible range of 
human understanding or knowledge. 
He recognizes that the fields of knowledge are very often 
desirable as subjects because together they can be used to 'develop 
understanding of all the various forms of knowledge. ,22 However, for 
16 
Hirst it would be paramount that the forms within the fields be 
emphasized and not the fields themselves. 'A course in various fields 
17 
... will not ... be a liberal education unless that aim is kept 
absolutely clear. 23 
This is not to say that he sees liberal education as the only 
form of education. He very significantly defines liberal education 
as 
only one part of the education a person ought to have, 
for it omits quite deliberately specialist education, 
physical education and character training. 24 
However, it is plain that for Hirst the academic side of the school 
curriculum and the practical and theoretical disciplines should all 
be squarely within the philosophical ambit of a liberal education. 
He quotes Michael Oakeshott as giving the final word on the 
subject. It is not 
an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit 
[such as a certificate], a contest where a winner gets 
a prize ... it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure 
... an initiation ... in which we learn to recognize ... 
to distinguish ... and in which we acquire the 
intellectual and moral habits ... which, in the end, give 
place and character to every human activity and 
utterance •25 
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CHAPTER 2 
A STUDY OF PHILIP H. PHENIX'S 'REALMS OF MEANING'. 
Introduction 
Like J.A. Bruner, Phenix perceives human learning as being 
related to the structures of knowledge and the processes of disciplined 
enquiry. His aim in writing Realms of Meaning was to 
'attempt to elaborate a philosophical theory of the 
curriculum for general education based on the idea of 
logical patterns in disciplined understanding. 1 
He is explicit that in using the term 'meaning' he not only 
embraces the processes of reasoned thought, but the life of feeling, 
conscience, inspiration and other processes not retained in the strict 
sense. Meaning, he suggests, has four dimensions. Firstly, he 
maintains there is that of inner experience, including the quality 
of reflectiveness, self-awareness and self-transcendence, which he 
asserts all varieties of meaning exemplify. Secondly, he suggests 
there is the dimension of rule, logic and principle. Thirdly, there 
is the dimension of selective elaboration, which he argues is limitless 
in extent theoretically, but in practice limited by what is perceived 
as significant with an inherent power of growth and elaboration. 
Finally, there is the dimension of expression, for the meanings he is 
interested in are not private property, but are communicable through 
symbols, which are objects that stand for meaning. 
Phenix organizes the scholarly disciplines in terms of their 
logical patterns into nine generic classes. He proposes that every 
meaning has two cognitive aspects, 'quantity' and 'quality'. That is 
to say, knowledge consists in a relation of the knower to some range 
of things known, and each relation, he suggests, is of some kind. 
19 
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He then argues that 'quantity' exists in three degrees: 
'singular', 'general' and 'comprehensive'. In other words it is either 
of one thing, or a selected group or of a whole totality. In turn he 
proposes a trinity of distict 'qualities' of meaning: 'fact', 'form' 
and 'norm', by which he means what actually exists, what may exist and 
what ought to exist respectively. 
By combining the various aspects of 'quantity' and 'quality' 
Phenix thus infers his nine generic classes of meaning, which he then 
reduces to six 'realms', treating the two normative classes together 
under 'ethics', and the three comprehensive classes together under 
i synopytics': 
(I) Symbolics (4) Synnoetics 
(2) Emprics (5) Ethics 
(3) Aesthetics (6) Synoptics 
Each 'realm' and each of itsconstituent'subrealms'he proposes 
may be described by referring to its typical methods, leading ideas, 
and characteristic structures. These features may be exhibited both 
in their uniqueness for each realm or subrealm and in their 
relationships and continuities with other types of meaning. 
(1) Symbolics  
This realm he suggests consists of ordinary language, 
mathematics and various types of what he terms 'non-discursive symbolic 
forms', such as gestures, rituals, rhythmic patterns and the like. 
Meanings in the symbolic realm are contained in arbitrary symbolic 
structures with socially accepted rules of formation and 
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transformation created as instruments for the expression and 
communication of any meaning whatsoever. These symbolic systems he 
proposes in one respect constitute the most fundamental of all the 
realms of meaning in that they must be used to express the meanings 
in the other realms. 
(2) Empirics  
The realm of empirics includes for Phenix the sciences of the 
physical world, of living things and of man. These sciences provide 
factual descriptions, generalizations and theoretical formulations 
and explanations which are based on observation and experimentation 
in the world of matter, life and mind. They express meanings as probable 
empirical truths framed in accordance with certain rules of evidence 
and verification and making use of specified systems of analytic 
abstraction. 
(3) Esthetics (sic)  
In this realm he includes the various arts, such as music, the 
visual arts, the arts of movement, and literature. Meanings in 
esthetics he argues are concerned with contemplative perception of 
particular significant things as what he terms 'unique 
objectifications of ideated subjectivities'.3 
(4) Synnoetics  
The realm of synnoetics embraces for Phenix what Michael Polanyi 
calls 'personal knowledge' and what Martin Buber calls the 'I-Thou' 
relationship. He derives the term from the Greek I syn' (= 'with') + 
noesis' (= 'cognition' ). Thus he infers synnoesis signifies 
'relational insight' or 'direct awareness'. It is analogous in the 
sphere of knowing to sympathy in the sphere of feeling. This personal 
or relational knowledge he proposes is concrete, direct and existential 
and may apply to oneself, to other persons or to things. 
(5) Ethics  
In the ethical realm he includes moral meanings that express 
obligation rather than fact, perceptual form or awareness of relation. 
In contrast to the sciences, the arts and to personal knowledge, for 
Phenix morality has to do with personal conduct that is based on free, 
responsible deliberate decision. 
(6) Synoptics  
This realm Phenix devises to refer to meanings that are 
comprehensively integrative. In it he includes history, religion and 
philosophy. These disciplines combine empirical, aesthetic and 
synnoetic meanings into coherent wholes. Historical interpretation 
he argues, comprises an artful recreation of the past, in obedience 
to factual evidence, for the purpose of revealing what man, by his 
deliberate choices, has made of himself within the context of his given 
circumstances. 
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Religion Phenix describes as being concerned with ultimate 
meanings, that is with meanings from any realm whatsoever, considered 
from the standpoint of such boundary concepts as the Whole, the 
Comprehensive and the Transcendent. 
Philosophy, he suggests, provides analytic clarification, 
evaluation and synthetic coordination of all the other realms through 
a reflective conceptual interpretation of all possible kinds of meaning 
in their distinctiveness and their interrelationships. 
Explication of the six 'realms'  
The First Realm: Symbolics  
(1) Ordinary Language  
This 'realm' is characterized for Phenix by arbitrary symbolic 
structures exhibiting what he calls 'certain customary rules of 
construction and interpretation'. 4 By the term 'ordinary language' 
Phenix means the forms of discourse in everyday speech and writing. 
Technical languages deliberately created for special purposes are not 
included. 
There are of course many languages or symbolic systems he points 
out. Knowledge of a language means that a person is able to use 
meaningful symbols for communication. Therefore knowledge of a 
language comprises all the elements: use, meaning, symbol and 
communication. The test of a person's knowledge of a language Phenix 
argues is whether or not he can use it. Speaking words and reciting 
grammatical rules is meaningless unless they can be organized into 
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intelligible discourse. The objective of using language is 
communication. It is a binding force in society. Through language 
communities are created and sustained. 
Language behaviour and the language community are, he 
maintains, just the outer face of language. The inner face is meaning. 
Language is not just a system of signals to which a properlyconstituted 
organism responds. It constitutes meanings. 
What Phenix terms 'ideation' or the putting together of thoughts 
and ideas (a concept borrowed from Noam Chomsky) intervenes between 
word and act. Speech, therefore, is not a stimulus to action. It is 
its content, an inner experience of meanings to which a person's deeds 
are related. It follows, therefore, that a person knows a language 
only if he understands its meanings, and not if he merely responds 
automatically to verbal signals. 
The meaning-content of a language he argues is expressed by 
symbols and these symbolic expressions have certain characteristic 
structures. The subject matter of language is the formal structures 
of symbols by which meanings are expressed. 
Knowledge of language is knowledge of particulars, but on the 
other hand he proposes that it is general in the sense that the sounds, 
meanings and grammatical forms are all classes of similar particulars. 
A person can be said to know a language only to the extent that he has 
practical competence in both the particular and the general aspects 
mentioned above. 
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For Phenix, to learn a language is to master the formal symbolic 
systems by which the meanings of the particular community of discourse 
are expressed. The distinctive logic of language is this abstraction, 
which he describes as 
the source of its power to express an infinite variety 
of experiences and to represent the real world in all 
its depth and complexity. 5 
By this 'miracle of language' the boundless world is opened to shared 
understanding. 
(2) Mathematics  
Phenix connects mathematics with the languages because like the 
languages it is a collection of arbitrary symbolic systems. While like 
ordinary language knowledge of mathematics consists in the ability to 
use symbols to communicate meanings, there are significant differences 
between the two in emphasis. He argues that while the uses of ordinary 
language are largely practical, mathematics is not primarily 
practical, nor is it created as a major basis for social cohesion. It 
does have practical uses, particularly in science and technology, but 
these practical uses are not of the essence of mathematics as the social 
uses of ordinary discourses are. 
Mathematical symbolisms are essentially theoretical. They 
constitute an intellectual discipline, the forms of which are not 
determined by the exigencies of adjustment to nature and society. 
Unlike ordinary language mathematics is not chiefly concerned with the 
community's adaptation to the actual world of things and people. 
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Mathematical symbol i sms he argues occupy an independent, 
self-contained world of thought. The realm of mathematics is that of 
'pure' symbolic forms, 'the applications of which, no matter how 
useful, are secondary and incidental to the essential symbolic 
meanings.
i6 
Phenix defines it another way as a language of complete 
abstraction. Unlike ordinary language, knowing mathematics concerns 
knowing about the subject. One really knows the subject only 
if he does his mathematics with self-conscious 
awareness, examining and justifying each step... in the 
light of the canons of rigorous proof. 7 
In one more crucial respect mathematics for Phenix is other than 
what is usually designated a language. Besides the 'linguistic' 
features of a means of expression and communication using witten or 
spoken symbols it includes what he terms 'chains of logical reasoning.' 
It is a discipline in which formal symbolic systems are constructed 
by positing certain undefined terms (elements, sets, rules of 
combination), elaborating further concepts by definitions 
(conventions), adopting certain postulates (concerning both the 
undefined and the defined terms), and then, using the principles of 
logic, drawing necessary deductive inferences, resulting in an 
aggregate of propositions called 'theorems'. 
(3) Nondiscursive symbolic forms  
To say that ordinary languages or mathematics are 'discursive' 
is to say that they are used for communicating ideas in a consecutive, 
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connected fashion, following the principles of common logic. What he 
calls the I nondiscursive l symbolic forms are used in all the arts and 
for the expression of feelings, values, commitments and insights in 
the domains of personal knowledge, metaphysics and religion. 
In these fields the aim is not literal statement but figurative 
expression. The appeal is principally to the imagination rather than 
to consecutive argument. In the non-discursive domains language is 
used to express personal subjectivity. In the discursive domains 
language is used outwardly; in the non-discursive it is used inwardly. 
He quotes A.N. Whitehead and S. Langer who have defined this 
contrast by means of the concept of 'presentational immediacy'. That 
is, in the discursive forms meanings unfold in sequential argument; 
in the non-discursive forms meanings are presented in direct or 
immediate insight. This is not to infer, Phenix argues, that the 
non-discursive forms have no logic. They have their own distinctive 
patterns, characteristic orders and relationships. 
The non-discursive symbolisms are chiefly used to express 
meanings in the realms of aesthetic experience, personal knowledge and 
synoptic insight. They are also sometimes used in practical affairs 
and ordinary social life, as in the case of signals, manners, gestures 
and rituals, when the purposes of communication are best served by 
direct presentation of a form instead of by reasoning to a conclusion. 
He calls this 'particular sensory objectifications of 
subjective states' , 8 and categorizes nine different types of this form: 
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(I) Signals: Although understood literally and logically are 
nondiscursive because they are understood reflectively. 
Examples are bells, whistles, coloured lights and 'natural' 
signals such as a dog barking or a snake hissing. 
(2) Bodily gestures: These are sometimes signals but at other times 
are symptoms of inner conditions. 
(3) Facial expressions: The same for (2) above applies to facial 
expressions. Both are important cues to ordinary language 
understanding. 
(4) Manners and Customs: Actions are often culturally determined, 
such as the myriad of acts between parents and children 
symbolizing respect, authority and freedom, dependence and 
independence, responsibility and other aspects of status and 
expectation. 
(5) Ritual: This is more stylized and less individual than gesture. 
It expresses through symbolic acts meanings at a deeper level than 
everyday experience. Most are communal and revolve around 'rites 
de passage'. 
(6) Graphic or Object-symbols: These are bearers of meaning that 
exceed the bounds of ordinary logic. Examples are flags, stars, 
crescents, crosses, astronomical signs and so on. 
(7) Dreams: This field is a uniquely significant class of symbols 
which is just beginning to become accepted as 'important 
communications by ourselves to ourselves' (or at least our 
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psychoanalysts), thanks to the developmental energies of Fromm 
and Jung on the pioneering work of Freud.
9 
(8) Myths, allegories, parables and fairy tales: Although these use 
ordinary language they communicate non-discursive meanings by 
imparting the figurative or metaphorical sense rather than the 
literal sense of ordinary discourse. This group of non-discursive 
symbolisms is by no means a sharply defined group. It overlaps 
with the domain of literature. 
(9) The forms in which the other arts are expressed: Harmony, tone 
and rhythmic conventions in music, colour, texture and movements 
organized according to conventions in the visual arts and 
characterisation, setting and literary devices such as simile and 
cadence in literature are all non-discursive in effect. The list 
of forms, however, is much greater than this. 
The Second Realm: Empirics  
(1) Physical Science  
For Phenix although physical science requires ordinary language 
and mathematics for its expression it is concerned with fact rather 
than symbolic conventions. Knowledge in science is of the actual world 
as it appears to be in sense experience and as it is inferred to be 
on the basis of this experience. It is aimed at the discovery of truth, 
and so, he argues, conventions are never true or false, they are only 
more or less convenient or appropriate to specified purposes. 
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Science is characterized by descriptions which are essentially 
abstract. In physical science descriptions of the world are 
experienced through the activity of physical measurement of such things 
as mass, length and time. This provides scientific data through which 
generalizations, laws and theories can be formulated. 
These are a result of hypotheses, experiments and observations. 
The principles, generalizations and laws are not directly inferred from 
the data of observation. The observations do not test the truth or 
falsity of hypotheses, but rather their scope and limitations. 
(2) Biology  
Meanings in biology are of the same general logical type as 
meanings in physical science, Phenix suggests, in that they are 
empirical descriptions of matters of fact, ideally formulated in terms 
of exact laws and explanatory theories of great generality. The 
differences between the life sciences and physical science consist in 
the scope of their subject matter. Rather than being concerned with 
all matter-energy systems, biology only deals with those which are 
alive. 
As it turns out, precisely delineating the class of living 
things, he points out, is in itself one of the central tasks of this 
empirical sub-realm. Briefly, he describes a thing as being alive 
if it sustains itself through dynamic interaction with 
its environment, using matter and energy from without 
in such a way as to preserve its own integrity and to 
reproduce its own kind.10 
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This is clearly a more limited domain than the physical 
sciences. It is an autonomous science with its own process of 
classification. This taxonomy, he explains, is based on an arbitrary 
judgement of similarity in structure, function and development, which 
is generally agreed on by most qualified biologists. 
Classification is just one step in the search for meanings in 
biology. In the search for these meanings he explains, biologists use 
the method of natural history. Enquiry is directed at the question 
of how each particular kind of organism came to be what it was. The 
ruling idea of natural history is the concept of 'evolution', in which 
three concepts figure prominently: inheritable variations, adaptation 
and natural selection. 
More general than the methods of taxonomy and natural history 
are the interrelated methods of structural and functional analysis, 
the former being to do with patterns of organization, the latter with 
processes or modes of activity. 
Summing up, Phenix concludes, as in all science, biology is 
empirical, factual, descriptive and ultimately theoretical and 
general, yielding understandings both of individual living things and 
the multitude of kinds of animate creatures inhabiting the earth. 
(3) Psychology  
This empirical sub-realm, Phenix proposes, has a similar 
relationship to biology as biology to physical science in that it is 
dependent on and included in the second, yet remains autonomous within 
its own sphere. The subject matter of 'mind' sets it apart. 
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He points out the controversy that exists as to what 'mind' 
really is. Some regard it as an inner psychic reality directly known 
to the conscious person and not dependent on anything else. At the 
other extreme it is considered as nothing but the activity of the brain, 
which is nothing but a matter-energy complex wholly explicable by 
physical science. 
In order to be objective he explains the observable behaviour 
of the higher animals forms a major part of the attempt to discover 
what is mind by observing how mind influences action. Formulations 
in this field rely heavily on skill in experimental design and in the 
interpretation of statistical data. Statistics are used as a means 
for direct quantitative descriptions of groups or populations. By 
'correlation analysis' it is possible to formulate certain 
generalizations or laws. 
Thus in common with the other sub-realms in the empirical realm 
psychology has meanings which Phenix shows are empirical, descriptive 
and theoretical. However, he adds the caution that there is a major 
still unresolved issue in this field. That is the degree to which the 
high abstractions and quantifications of the natural sciences can do 
justice to the facts of mind, especially in human beings. 
(4) Social Science  
Phenix identifies five principal social sciences: social 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and political science. 
They are all clearly in the domain of the sciences of man, he argues. 
The effort to identify with the concepts of the natural sciences is 
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not as evident as in psychology. Phenix argues that geography, too, 
may be included, being a descriptive discipline, but he omits it because 
its ideal is not generalizations or 'laws'. 
Phenix describes social science as dealing with 'the world of 
culture and society, a world of which human beings are the 
architects' . 11 For this reason abstractions from the world of natural 
science are inappropriate. Each of the social sciences has developed 
its own descriptive terminology, scientific methodology and concepts. 
For this reason he concludes the social sciences are similar enough 
to the natural sciences to be included in the empirical realm. 
Above all, however, he maintains that the social sciences are 
policy sciences, since all are concerned in some waywith 
the deliberate artifacts of culture ... rather than with 
the given facts of nature. In this respect meanings in 
the social sciences are similar to those in the realm 
of symbolics, and the empirical and symbolic domains 
overlap. 12 
The Third Realm: Esthetics (sic)  
Phenix sets the aesthetic meanings in the arts aside from 
symbolic and empirical meanings primarily because of their 
'particularity' by which he means that in contrast to 'general' 
symbolic meanings the object of knowledge is the single, unique, 
individual 'particular' form. 
. The primary concern is not with types of things as in 
symbol-systems or general laws and theories, but with individual 
objects which are unique and essentially incomparable. 
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Knowledge in the aesthetic realm is gained by 'acquaintance' 
and not by 'description'. Each work of art contains its own meaning 
and speaks for itself. Its significance cannot be embodied in separable 
symbolic patterns. Aesthetic understanding is 'immediate', that is 
referring directly to the objects perceived. Although, Phenix 
maintains, aesthetic objects may contain propositions, as in drama, 
unlike in the sciences these propositions merely contribute to the 
content of the work of art and their truth or falsity is not the measure 
of the aesthetic meaning of the work. 
That is not to say, he states, that science and art are mutual ly 
exclusive. Deep aesthetic meaning may be found in things studied 
scientifically and the theoretical structures of science may 
themselves aesthetically admirable. Likewise aesthetic forms such as 
the sonata or harmony can be analyzed empirically, but it is the kinds 
of understanding gained that set these realms apart, the difference 
between the general-descriptive and the individual-perceptive modes. 
For Phenix the aesthetic meanings are best discovered in 
connection with a study of the arts, because he believes it is through 
them that aesthetic meaning is most directly and deliberately 
cultivated. 
Of particular significance are the fine arts, traditionally 
consisting of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, dance 
and drama, which have been commonly regarded as the main source of the 
aesthetic heritage of mankind. 
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He acknowledges the practical arts and crafts as exercising a 
much more persuasive influence on the aesthetic consciousness of 
mankind. However, he feels the fine arts provide the basis for the 
analysis of what he terms the 'distinctive varieties of esthetic 
signification in their most pure and unambiguous forms.
,13 
They are 
to the aesthetic cultivation of mankind, he feels, what the pure 
sciences are to the general development of empirical competences. 
For the sake of simplicity he groups the seven fine arts 
mentioned above into music, visual arts, arts of movement and 
literature. 
(1) Music: Meanings in music are contained in individual musical 
compositions. These compositions Phenix describes as 'patterned 
sequences of sounds deliberately created for an esthetic purpose.
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They are to be listened to for their own intrinsic interest and not 
for any ulterior utilitarian ends. 
The meaning of each musical composition belongs to that 
composition alone and is not derived from its membership in any 
collection of such compositions. The musical sounds directly impart 
their own qualitative meanings. They do not stand for ideas, as do 
the elements of intelligible speech. 
The meaning of music, he suggests, is most intimately connected 
with the rhythmic sense. The meaning is not simply a matter of 
intellectual comprehension. It is also an act of organic response in 
which 'the vital rhythms upon which life depends are brought into 
relation to the sound patterns of music.'15 
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The ultimate object of aesthetic attention is not the qualities 
disclosed by analysis of such things as melodic motifs or fugal 
development, but the work as a whole. Hence, Phenix infers, if a piece 
of music is to qualify as a composition worthy of aesthetic interest, 
it must have a certain organic unity among its parts. The source of 
significance is the single, complex whole. 
(2) The Visual Arts: Phenix includes the fields of drawing, painting, 
sculpture, graphic arts and architecture in this domain. They differ 
from music in that they have a degree of individual permanence. They 
are concrete rather than ephemeral, persisting only in memory and 
needing to be recreated (or electronically reproduced) to be enjoyed. 
In common with all the arts the visual arts create single objects 
that articulate significant patterns of subjective feeling. Unlike 
music, the primary mode of perception is visual, not aural. Space is 
of crucial importance together with the material qualities and their 
integration into a whole through the element of 'design', which might 
incorporate many diverse concepts such as depth, tone, texture, 
perspective, colour, light and shade, mass, volume and style. Lastly 
its meaning consists in its individuality, its uniqueness. 
He extends the view of the eminent art historian Gombrich that 
'there is no such thing as art. There are only artists.
,16 
For Phenix 
'there are not even artists, but only particular works of art.' 17 
(3) The Arts of Movement: This subrealm is included in Phenix's 
epistomological taxonomy because he perceives it as being vital for 
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the expression and perception of human meaning on the grounds that the 
sense of movement is inherent in every human activity. He argues that 
all perceptions of the surrounding world are accompanied by motor 
reactions, and the earliest and most elemental of all the arts was 
therefore understandably the dance. It is the primordial art form, 
he maintains. 
By the term 'arts of movement' he includes 
all intentional activities, undertaken for aesthetic 
purposes, in which the desired expressive effeqA are 
communicated by the movement of the human body. 10 
He sees them as the foundation for physical education, health and 
recreation. 
The fundamental concept in this field is the 'organic unity' 
of the person. Of all the arts, he believes, they best exemplify the 
concept of immediate perception, since the person's own body is the 
instrument of expression and response. 
The goal of such education is personal wholeness, a rejection 
of the concept of the duality of mind and body. For Phenix this is 
the essence of health. 
An important part in the achievement of this he believes is the 
spirit of play, which Johann Huizinga has shown is a powerful force 
in the creation of culture in all its aspects. He accepts Huizinges 
critical analysis of the meaning of play, to which he (Huizinga) 
attributes eight characteristic features: 
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(I) It is free, not obligatory. 
(2) It is concerned with a make-believe world. 
(3) It occurs within a limited space and time and is thus a definite, 
finite object. 
(4) It has order. 
(5) Play lives on contest and tension. 
(6) It proceeds according to rules which are absolutely binding 
equally on each player. 
(7) Play activities tend to form enduring communities. 
(8) Play associations tend to fulfil a human hunger for acceptance 
and group membership. 
In conclusion Phenix sums up the arts of movement as activities 
which are enriching for aesthetic meaning, both in individuals, and 
in the life of society. 
(4) Literature: Of all the arts Phenix sees literature as the most 
influential since language affords the literary artist a commonly 
understood and widely accepted medium. In contrast the other arts make 
use of symbolic forms not so generally understood. Despite this, the 
medium of language in literature is often misunderstood as literary 
meanings are not taken figuratively but literally. 
He argues that the literary use of language is non-discursive 
in that is is deliberately exploited for expressive effect to stimulate 
contemplation and the imagination. As in the other aesthetic fields 
the subject matter is primarily the individual work as a whole, whether 
poem, novel, play or essay. In all these forms aesthetic excellence 
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is a consequence of skillful composition, a 'figurative articular 
representation of significant intersubjective abstractions.
sI9 
The Fourth Realm: Synnoetics  
In his introduction to this realm Phenix proposes that all 
meanings consist of certain discriminations, organizations and 
interpretations of experience. Each realm includes what he calls 
aspects of experience of a particular logical type which 
result from special kinds of selection and focping 
(sic) within the complex totality of experience. 40 
In his fourth realm of knowledge the selection and organization 
of experience is of a distinctively different logical kind. Meanings 
in this realm are a person's direct insight into other beings (or 
oneself) as a concrete whole existing in 'relation'. Whereas in the 
first three realms knowledge requires 'detachment', synnoetic meaning 
requires what he calls 'engagement'. In other words the knower effects 
a direct meaning. 
Knowledge in symbol ics, empirics and aesthetics is 'objective', 
depending on a 'subject-object relationship'. Synnoetic meanings 
relate subjects to subjects. Objectivity is replaced by what he calls 
s intersubjectivity l . There is no separation between subject •and 
object, but a personal meeting takes place. 
Meanings in this personal realm are 'concrete' rather than 
'abstract', in the sense that relational understanding is not a 
fragment, a perspective or a transformation of some other more complex 
experience. Rather, it is itself the 'prototype of experience' in its 
wholeness or concreteness. 
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He posits Martin Buber's discussion of the 'I-Thou 
relationship' as being central to an understanding of meaning in the 
realm of personal knowledge. According to Buber, fullness of being 
consists in 'relation'. In the 'I-Thou' relation the attitude of 
manipulation is absent. One does not try to use the other with whom 
one stands in relation, but rather affirms and respects the other's 
being. Freedom is essential. 
'Love' is a fundamental concept in this, by which is not meant 
a subjective experience, state of feeling or passion. It means simply 
the reality of the active caring, responsible relation of an 'I' to 
a 'Thou', a concept identical to Christian 'love' but not acknowledged 
as such. 
In Buber's view personal relations can also occur in our life 
with nature and in our spiritual life. This personalization of 
relationships underlies the basic ideal of 'reverence for life'. As 
for life in the spiritual sphere, Buber holds that every 'I-Thou' 
relation is grounded in a relation to the eternal Thou. 
Phenix notes that each of the arts can aid in the deepening of 
personal knowledge. Among them, drama especially stands out as a means 
for growth in personal insight. He sees great drama, and particularly 
tragic drama, as revealing the essential truths of life. Comic drama, 
too, he believes achieves this, many critics maintaining it to be a 
more authentic source of personal knowledge than tragedy. Nathan Scott 
argues that the tragic hero is an extremist who forgets that he is a 
man, and not an angel. Thus, tragic man cannot serve as well as comic 
man to reveal the whole truth about the human situation.21 
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Phenix maintains that persons grow to healthy maturity through 
their encounters with others. However, choices may be made in which 
the relations of freedom and love are denied. In that event, he argues, 
personal meanings are impaired and the self loses its integrity and 
creativity. To restore personal wholeness, therapeutic methods have 
been evised, together with theoretical models of the human psyche, 
which are intended to guide the practice of healing. These conceptual 
patterns, enriched by insights from phenomenology, existentialism, 
theology and above all from literature he argues, provide a basis for 
disciplined understanding in the synnoetic realm, making possible 
reliable education in a domain that is of fundamental importance for 
the life of man and society. 
The Fifth Realm: Ethics 
The essence of ethical meanings, or of moral knowledge, 
is right, deliberate,action, that is, what a person ought 
voluntarily to do. 22 
Phenix compares and contrasts ethics with the other realms to show its 
unique logic, and therefore status as a separate realm. In the realm 
of symbolic meaning, he proposes, the word 'ought' in the statement 
'in English-speaking countries we ought to use English', is very 
different from the 'ought' in a moral sense. 
To show the difference between ethics and empirics Phenix quotes 
David Hume, who two centuries ago pointed out that one can never 
correctly make an inference from what is to what ought to be nor 
vice-versa. Fact and moral obligation are of essentially different 
logical orders. For Phenix, ethical concepts are not used to designate 
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properties of things. Instead they are 'gerundives', by which he means 
that they are based on the idea of 'worthy-of'. For example, the value 
concept 'truth' is a gerundive because it means 'worthy of credence'. 
Turning to the aesthetic realm he proposes that ethical meanings 
differ from aesthetic ones in that the latter arise from disinterested 
perception, while the former are concerned with active, personal 
commitment. In the arts things are created for purposes of 
contemplation. In ethics acts are done for purposes of participation. 
Furthermore, artistic works are unique and individual, while moral acts 
are generally though to exemplify universal principles of 
'obligation'. 
The most important difference between aesthetic meanings and 
ethical meanings for Phenix is that in the former the basic ethical 
idea of 'right' or 'obligation' is absent. To maintain the relative 
independence of the two realms is not to deny the possibility of 
judgements from one realm to the other. A work of art can be judged 
on moral principles. Similarly moral principles may be judged from 
an aesthetic viewpoint. 
Finally, comparing the ethical realm with the synnoetic realm, 
he *proposes that while both are realms of decision, commitment and 
active engagement the former is abstract and general, while the latter 
is personal. Moral choice does have personal elements in it, in that 
the whole being of the person is expressed in the decision to act. 
However, it is impersonal in that the morality of the act is not a 
function of the person in his singularity, but of the situation. Above 
all he maintains, ethics differ from personal knowledge in respect to 
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the element of 'obligation' or 'what ought to be done'. The 'ought' 
is not individual but universal. 
The Sixth Realm: Synoptics  
For Phenix the term I synoptics' comprises meanings which have 
an integrative function, uniting meanings from all the 'realms' into 
a unified perspective; that is, providing a 'single vision' or 
'synopsis' of meanings. The chief synoptic disciplines are history, 
religion and philosophy, each achieving the integration of meaning in 
a different way. History imaginatively recreates the past. Religion 
attempts to disclose ultimate meanings. Philosophy critically 
interprets expressed meanings. 
He proposes that while each could without serious objection be 
treated as a separate realm, they share one fundamental purpose of 
integrative understanding. As with ordinary language and mathematics 
in the realm of symbolic meaning, they differ only in the manner in 
which they effect understanding. 
(I) History: The central category for Phenix in the field of history 
is time. The subject matter is human events of the past. It unites 
what he calls the 'abstract objectivity of parametric time' in science 
and 'rhythmic time' in language and the arts with the 'concrete 
subjectivity of time 'in personal relations and particular moral 
decisions yielding a realization of 'whole time s . 23 
He proposes that the unit of historical inquiry is the 'event', 
'happening' or 'episode'. The task of the historian, he explains, is 
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to describe, order and interpret events which are concrete in the form 
of convincing stories. These events are conceived as outcomes of 
personal existential decisions at particular times. Hypotheses about 
what happened are formed by the imaginative recreation of the past, 
using relevant empirical knowledge from every field, together with 
personal understanding and ethical insight. Finally, these hypotheses 
are tested and progressively improved by checking them with the effects 
of the past in the form of present evidence. 
(2) Religion: The common element uniting all the realms in, Phenix 
argues, is the concept of I ultimacy l , by which he means 'such ideas 
as infinitude, absoluteness, the unlimited, transcendence, 
perfection, completeness, all-inclusiveness, the Supreme and 
others. 
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The content of religion may be anything at all, provided it is 
regarded from an 'ultimate' perspective. Religious meanings thus he 
infers comprehend and include all things, and a religious attitude with 
respect to any given thing is to consider it in the light of all that 
is, that is from the standpoint of the Whole. 
The basis of understanding, Phenix proposes, is 'faith', and 
not the forms of understanding that characterize the other relams. 
Faith is the l light that shines from the Whole', he argues, which is 
the 'Comprehensive that comprehends or hold together all things in a 
transcendent unity' and is itself not comprehensible within any finite 
entity since it is infinite.
25 
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Many different symbolic forms are used as the vehicles of faith. 
Rituals and sacraments, he suggests, are attempts to approach the 
divine reality which is at once the ground of personal being, the law 
of life, the foundation of hope and the creative source of all things. 
(3) Philosophy: For Phenix this synoptic field is concerned with every 
kind of human experience and not with any one domain. Nothing, he 
asserts, is beyond the limits of philosophic scrutiny. It is thus, 
he infers, the most inclusive of the synoptic disciplines. 
Whereas it is the function of the other fields of knowledge to 
express meaning, it is the distinctive function of philosophy to 
interpret meaning. Thus, the meanings expressed in philosophy are 
'meanings of meanings', or what he calls I metameanings l . 
The method of philosophy he suggests is essentially that of 
'dialectic', by which is meant a process of conceptual examination by 
raising questions, proposing answers and developing the implications 
of those answers in continuing cycles. Thus, he explains, the 
philosopher is committed to continued inquiry. This is essentially 
a process of 
analysis, evaluation and synthesis of meaning into 
principles and laws of great generality, relating widely 
diverse fields of experience through some common 
conceptual scheme. 26 
Thus, he states, 
philosophers create synoptic views of the entire range 
of expressible human experiences, insofar as they can 
be interueted in the categories of rational 
discourse." 
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CHAPTER 3 
A SYNOPSIS OF THE MAIN IDEAS, ISSUES, CONCEPTS AND PROPOSITIONS 
THROUGH WHICH THE 'FORMS' AND 'REALMS' MAY BE COMPARED 
Introduction 
Phenix's 'Realms of Meaning' and Hirst's 'Forms of Knowledge' 
can best be compared on the basis of their views of 'mind', 'knowledge', 
'meaning', understanding' and 'reality' and the relationships between 
them. Each writer uses the concept of 'mind' in a comparable manner. 
For Hirst it is the 'self-conscious, rational mind of man'; for Phenix 
'mind' is synonymous with 'reason'. Hirst and Phenix use the concepts 
of 'knowledge', 'meaning' and 'understanding' in vaguely similar ways, 
but Hirst does not use his concept of 'knowledge' to incl ude existential 
experience or what Phenix calls I synnoetics l , his fourth realm of 
meaning. The concept of 'reality' is essentially the same for both 
men, though Hirst explores its inter-relationship with the concept of 
'knowledge' more assiduously than does Phenix. 
Lastly the sum total of the 'realms' or 'forms', what Phenix 
calls 'general education' and Hirst calls 'liberal education' can be 
compared as the bridges through the use of which the connections between 
mind, knowledge/meaning/understanding and reality can be made. 
Phenix's Concept of Meaning 
Phenix introduces 'meaning' as a unifying concept to bind 
together the broader connotations of the idea of 'reason'. In his own 
words he uses it 'to express the full range of connotations of reason 
or mind'. 1 For Phenix there are different 'meanings' contained in 
activities for the body, in perception, in logical thinking, in social 
organisation, in speech, in artistic creation, in self-awareness and 
awareness of others, in purposive decision, in moral judgement, in the 
consciousness of time and in the activity of worship. 
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As mentioned previously, he delineates four dimensions of 
'meaning', using the term to embrace not only the patterns of rational 
thining, but the life of feeling, conscience, inspiration and other 
processes Hirst would not include in that concept. 
The first of Phenix's four dimensions of meaning is 
'experience', by which he means the sense in which it pertains to human 
consciousness and, refers to the 'inner life' of man. This 'inner life' 
he sees as having the peculiar quality of reflectiveness or 
self-awareness. As a reflective experience, Phenix sees meaning as 
presupposing a basic principle of duality, or of self-transcendence. 
In self-consciousness a person both is himself and yet stands 
outside himself, Phenix maintains. He is at one and the same time 'both 
subject and object, knower and known, agent and patient, observer and 
observed.' 2 This duality he believes is what enables a person to 'know' 
anything at all. One 'knows' something, he proposes, if one is at one 
and the same time distinct from and identified with what one knows. 
For Phenix all perception of relationships is based on 'this duality. 
A relationship is 'identity-in-difference', by which he means two 
things are united in the one act of consciousness in order that their 
'non-identity' may also be recognised. 
All the varieties of human meaning exemplify this 
self-transcendence, which for Phenix is the secret of man's unique 
adaptability. This inherently dual quality of experience he sees as 
the source of all that is characteristically human. 
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Phenix's second dimension of meaning is that of 'rule', 'logic' 
or 'principle'. He proposes that the many types of meaning are 
distinguished from one another by some difference in characteristic 
form. Each type of meaning has its own rule that makes it one kind 
of meaning and not another. Each is defined by a particular logic or 
structural principle. Meaning is not an undifferentiated experience 
of awareness, he maintains. Consciousness is differentiated into a 
'variegated array of logical types: 3 
Phenix's third dimension of meaning is 'selective elaboration'. 
He proposes that theoretically there is no limit to the varieties of 
meaning, as different principles of meaning formation can be devised 
ad infinitum and new combinations and nuances of rule can be imagined 
without limit. Since not all of these possible kinds are humanly 
important he contends that from the endless variety selection occurs. 
The types that are significant in actual human life are the ones that 
have an inherent power of growth and lead to the elaboration of the 
enduring traditions of civilization. These are the kinds of meaning 
that have proven fruitful in the development of the cultural heritage 
of mankind. 
Whilst Phenix contends he could attempt an a priori analysis 
of possible classes of meaning and try to forecast which would prove 
most fertile, he concludes that it would be far more logical to benefit 
from the long experience of mankind and regard as most significant the 
forms of meaning that have actually demonstrated their fecundity. 
He identifies these selected types of meaning by means of the 
'specialists who serve as the guardians, refiners and critics of the 
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cultural heritage. 14 Each of these men of knowledge he explains belongs 
to a community that is for the most part invisible, comprised of people 
united by common responsibility for a particular kind of meaning. Each 
such community has its characteristic discipline or rule by which the 
common responsibility is discharged. This discipline expresses the 
particular logic of the meaning in question. 
What these men know is what Phenix sees as meanings. The 
operative kinds of meanings he sees are revealed in the work of 
linguists, mathematicians, scientists of various types, artists, 
critics, moralists, historians, theologians and philosophers who 
together form the world of scholarship. 
On the other hand, he is at pains to point out that this does 
not assume that the universe of meanings is exhausted by the particular 
collection of meanings of any given civilization and represented by 
a corresponding collection of scholarly disciplines. Meanings wax and 
wane, he contends, as do the disciplines responsible for them. For 
this reason he concludes that meanings must be regarded as tentative 
and incomplete. 
Phenix's fourth dimension of meaning is 'expression'. He states 
that meanings that have civilizing power are communicable through 
symbols, which are objects that stand for meanings. The possibility 
of what he calls symbolization, he believes is dependent on the unique 
human power of self-transcendence, for he contends that the dual 
quality of reflective awareness is required to understand a symbol. 
52 
The essence of a symbol he asserts, is that it is both identified 
with what it refers to yet is distinguishable from it. He gives the 
word 'tree' as an example. It is not a tree, yet by the power of thought 
stands for a tree. Symbolization also presupposes for Phenix 
self-transcendence in the awareness of a common world, for the symbols 
are taken as having the same or similar connotation to oneself as to 
others into whose being one imaginatively projects onself. 
The symbolic expressions of meaning he states are of particular 
concern to the scholarly communities exercising 'guardianship' over 
the different types of meaning, as the distinctive expressions and 
peculiar logic are essential for critical analysis and elaboration of 
the different domains of meaning. 
As already stated in chapter two of this discussion Phenix then 
concludes that if the essence of human nature is in the life of meaning, 
then to promote the growth of meaning educators need to understand the 
kinds of meaning in order to construct the school curriculum on this 
basis.
5 
In this, what Phenix calls the 'life of meaning' is a very 
similar concept to what Hirst would call the 'pursuit of knowledge' 
or the 'development of mind'. 
To achieve this Phenix divides the many scholarly disciplines 
into broad categories of meaning along the lines of general similarity 
of logical structure. His study of the logical patterns of the 
disciplines leads him to divide them into the nine generic classes of 
meaning previously referred to in chapter two of this discussion. 
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Where he differs from Hirst is that Hirst bases his forms on 
'linguistic intersubjectivity' in looking at different propositional 
'objects of knowledge' in different ways. 
Phenix's classes of meaning it will be recalled derive from his 
use of the concepts of 'quantity' and 'quality' to refer to meaning, 
classical notions of logical differences which Hirst is severely 
critical of. These two logical aspects Phenix considers are of 
substantial significance to his theory. In summary, he identifies 
three degrees of quantity: 'singular', 'general' and 'comprehensive', 
by which he means knowledge is of one thing, of a selected plurality 
or of a totality. Furthermore, he identifies three distinct qualities 
of meaning: 'fact', 'form' and 'norm'. These are discussed in chapter 
two of this discussion. 
The nine generic classes of meaning he proposes are obtained 
by pairing the three quantity aspects with the three quality aspects 
in all possible combinations. They are briefly characterized below 
and are associated with the discipline or disciplines to which Phenix 
feels they apply. 
(I) 'General Forth'. In this class he includes the disciplines that 
are concerned with the elaboration of formal patterns for general 
application in the expression of meanings. They comprise the 
various symbol systems of ordinary language, mathematics and 
logic, gesture, ritual and nondiscursive symbolic conventions. 
(2) 'General Fact'. When his general forms are related to reality 
they express the kind of knowledge that he feels is the special 
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province of the sciences. These disciplines are concerned with 
material truth expressed in the general laws and theories of the 
real world as expressed in the natural and social sciences. 
(3) 'Singular Form'. In this class Phenix includes meanings perceived 
in imagination without any necessary reference to actual fact, 
and as embodied in unique particular objects. This class of 
meanings he believes is basic to the various arts. 
(4) 'Singular Fact'. This class of meaning is unique to Phenix and 
severely attacked by Hirst. It includes 'meanings' arising out 
of what Phenix calls 'concrete existence in direct personal 
encounter' . 6 They are reflectively elaborated, he maintains, in 
existential philosophy, religion, psychology and some 
literature. 
(5) 'Singular Norm'. In this class Phenix includes particular moral 
obligations within a given situation where one seeks for knowledge 
of what one ought to do. The discipline of morals for Phenix is 
concerned with the methods of making and justifying such 
decisions. 
(6) 'General Norm'. For Phenix knowledge of singular norms and 
knowledge of general norms are closely associated since the latter 
is appealed to in justification of the former and the source for 
the latter. He distinguishes both singular and general norms by 
the quality of obligation. Further, although he states the 
ethical realm is not commonly divided into constituent 
disciplines, he suggests such a division is possible for 
theoretical analysis. 
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(7) 'Comprehensive Fact'. Phenix sees the study of reality from a 
comprehensive standpoint, including both the singularity of the 
unique event and the relationship of that event with other events, 
as the province of the discipline of history. He sees the 
historian's role as integrating a multitude of meanings of a 
symbolic, empirical, aesthetic and ethical nature into a 
'synoptic' perspective of the past. 
(8) 'Comprehensive Norm'. Phenix contends that when all kinds of 
knowledge are comprehended within a perspective controlled by the 
'normative' quality, the resulting discipline is religion. This 
religious knowledge he maintains is usually though to require an 
act of faith by which a total commitment is made to whatever is 
regarded as ultimately worthy of devotion. In this 'normative 
act' he sees all the various kinds of knowledge as being 
synthesized. 
(9) 'Comprehensive Form'. Phenix suggests that a formal 
consideration of knowledge in all its kinds belongs to the 
discipline of philosophy. He describes the philosopher's task 
as being to interpret meanings in any discipline by the use of 
concepts of wide generality, thus affording a 'synoptic' view of 
all the ways of knowing. 
For reasons that are only superficially stated, and not very 
convincingly at that, Phenix quite (unexplainably) decides to treat 
the two normative classes of his categories of meaning together under 
the category 'ethics', presumably because both include the feature of 
'obligation' or what 'ought' to be done in given situations. However, 
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by the same logic his singular fact and form classes both include the 
feature of intersubjectivity, yet these are not treated together. His 
general fact and form classes both include the feature of measurement, 
yet these are not treated together. 
By inadequately explicating the reasons for his merging of the 
two normative classes Phenix considerably undermines his theory. The 
fact that he treats the three comprehensive classes similarly together, 
without proper explication of his reasons, further weakens his 
argument. In any case it is evident that the philosophical principle 
of 'reducibility' which Phenix adheres to in some of his 'realms' is 
inconsistently applied. For example, although the symbolic realm of 
mathematics is widely acknowledged as irreducible in a dialectic sense, 
the synoptic realm of history in many instances is reducible to other 
realms. When, for instance one makes use of moral judgements in history 
one is making use of the 'ethical' realm. When one uses statistics 
one uses the realm of mathematics. When one makes use of archaeological 
data one is making use of the realm of empirics and so on. 
Hirst's Concept of Knowledge. This is intimately connected with the 
concepts of 'mind' and 'reality' referred to in the introduction to 
this chapter. 'Knowledge' for Hirst is only that which is 'public', 
without which he maintains 'emotional experiences or mental attitudes 
and beliefs, would seem to be unintelligible.
.7 Unlike Phenix's 
concept of meaning, Hirst's concept of knowledge does not include 'the 
life of feeling, conscience, inspiration and other processes not 
retained in the strict sense.
.8 
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Because of this, of central concern to Hirst's concept is just 
what it is that one is classifying when one talks of 'knowledge'. He 
uses the term 'objects of knowledge' to indicate what he means. By 
'objects of knowledge' Hirst means' the logical objects of knowledge 
when that state of mind is being distinguished from others.
,9 
In this 
sense he sees there being three types of 'logical objects': 
(1) Knowing people, places or things (that is knowledge with the 
direct object). 
(2) Knowing what is the case (that is a true statement or proposition). 
He uses the term 'knowledge - that' to describe this type of 
knowledge. 
(3) Knowing how or when to do certain things. he calls this 
'procedural knowledge' or 'knowledge-how'. 
Hirst does not consider knowledge with the direct object 
(intersubjective existential experience) to be a distinct type of 
'knowledge' (which he feels is 'objective' and should be kept separate 
from all other states of mind.) He quite unequivocally separates types 
of knowledge from types of experience and feeling. 
Hirst suggests that knowing is not an occurrent dispositional 
event or state of awareness at all. 'One knows all one knows when none 
of it is before one's mind.
,10 
 He maintains that coming to know may 
be an experience, but the knowledge achieved at that moment is not to 
be confused with the concomitant awareness. He asserts that 
existential experiences are intelligible and occur only by virtue of 
the concept or concepts which they involve, but that does not make them 
states of 'knowledge' . 
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Hirst concludes that if it is knowledge other than 
'knowledge-how' which one wishes to classify, it is 'knowledge-that' 
which one is concerned with, and through examination of particular 
types of logical thinking in this domain that the categories of 
knowledge can be identified. 
For this Hirst has been severely rebuked by many educational 
philosophers. Pring, Soltis and others have accused him of being 
'dangerously narrow'
11 in this regard. By only recognising 
'knowledge-that' or propositional knowledge Pring maintains that a 
consequence would be that art and literature would simply become 
subjects concerned with an appreciation of propositions rather than 
something to do and enjoy. 
In addition morality would become moral judgement, literary 
criticism would supplant writing or enjoying literature. Pring argues 
that 'important though it is to know that certain statements are true, 
knowing how to do things is equally important.' 12 
He continues 'Hirst is preoccupied with propositional knowledge 
... [and this] imposes too many academic restraints on an otherwise 
educational programme. 
,13 
For Hirst since it is the objects of knowledge that are of 
principal concern then all the propositions that are being considered 
must be true and therefore in at least one sense of that term state 
facts. If true propositions are to be classified as 'true' and nothing 
else then it must be 'by virtue of their logically necessary features 
and not by any other characteristics they may appear to have.
'14 
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Therefore as far as Hirst is concerned Phenix's nine generic classes 
of meaning are irrelevant. The reasons why he believes this will be 
discussed in the next chapter of this discussion. 
He suggests that the criteria that are necessary to their being 
true propositions are: 
(1) That concepts are appropriately related in a logical structure 
so that propositions can be formed. 
(2) That the propositions have 'truth-criteria'. 
His concept of 'truth-criteria' is based on the idea of 
'objectivity' through 'linguistic intersubjectivity'. In other words 
if something is to be accepted as public knowledge (i.e. it is 
objective' rather than subjective') then it is only through the use 
of publicly accepted and understood symbols that it is valid as 
knowledge. Therefore the 'truth-criteria' are in the public rather 
than the private domain. In other words, as he sees it if something 
is to count as 'knowledge' it must be publicly expressabl e and therefore 
publicly testable. 
He suggests that the two features of knowledge of logical 
structure and truth criteria are not logically independent of each 
other. Indeed he sees the existence of any concepts that are not in 
some way logically related to truth - criteria as problematic. For 
Hirst where the classification of knowledge is concerned the existence 
of truth-criteria is totally necessary and that presupposes the 
existence of a related structure of concepts. 
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All aspects of meaning for Hirst necessitate the use of concepts 
and it is only by virtue of conceptualization that there is anything 
we can call meaning at all. He proposes that no concepts can be the 
basis of shared meaning without criteria for their application. The 
criteria for the application of a concept, say 'X', he suggests, are 
the criteria for the truth of statements that say that something is 
an 'X'. Thus, Hirst concludes that by this chain of relations, 
'meaning necessitates concepts ... concepts necessitate 
criteria of application and ... criteria of application 
are truth - criteria for propositions and statements, 
the notions of meaning and true propositions.' 15 
Therefore, for Hirst meaning and knowledge are logically connected. 
Logically, Hirst sees the fundamental forms of meaning and those 
of knowledge as identical. He sees 'meaning', 'truth' and 'knowledge' 
as logically interconnected. Truth cannot be put before meaning, he 
contends, for the criteria for truth are the criteria for meaning. Nor—
does truth for Hirst only find expression within meaning, for the 
pattern of meaning is only established by truth-criteria, he says. The 
question of there being logically distinct forms of knowledge, he 
feels, is the question of there being logically distinct types of true 
propositions or statements. 
He proposes there are only two distinct types of knowledge, that 
in which the objects of knowledge are true propositions and that in 
which the objects are practical performances of some kind. To 
distinguish the types of true propositions he uses the three criteria 
of concepts, logical structure and the truth criteria in terms of which 
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they are assessed. These he uses to distinguish seven forms of 
knowledge which he calls 'the basic articulations whereby the whole 
of experience has become intelligible to man.' 16 
Although he proposes criteria for the forms he does not perceive 
them as the totality of their existence. He suggests that all knowledge 
involves the use of symbols and the making of judgements in ways that 
cannot be expressed in words and can only be learnt in a tradition. 
'Therefore acquiring knowledge of any form ... must be learnt from a 
master on the job. '17 
The dividing lines between the different forms even Hirst 
concedes are not 'sufficient for demarcating the whole world of modern 
knowledge. '18 The central feature to which they point he proposes is 
'some particular kind of test against experience'.
19 
He suggests the 
seven forms and the tests for them are: 
(1) The Sciences: empirical, experimental and observational tests. 
(2) Mathematics: deductive demonstrations from certain sets of 
axioms. 
(3) Moral Knowledge: Hirst says the tests are only partially statable 
(though he does not state what they are). 
(4) The Arts: as for Moral Knowledge. 
(5) Historical Knowledge: Hirst says in this domain the tests are for 
particular logical features (though he does not explain what these 
are). 
(6) Religious Knowledge: as for Historical Knowledge. 
(7) The Human Sciences: Hirst feels that because of the nature of their 
central concepts they should be regarded separately from the 
Physical Sciences (though he does not explicate what these 
concepts are.) 
Hirst has been severely criticized by Elliott, Pring and 
Langford for conceiving of knowledge in this way. Elliott makes perhaps 
the strongest attack by suggesting that all knowledge makes use of the 
same 'powers of mind', that is to say 'retention and anticipation, 
synthesis and synopsis, discernment of relations and discovery of 
structures, 'bracketing' properties and aspects discovering the 
objects of feelings and impressions, guesswork pushing ideas to the 
limit, shifts of perspective and aspect-seeing, capacity for 
appreciative response and capacity for renunciation of practical 
ends..
20  
Since he argues that the same powers of mind are at work in all 
the forms, Elliott maintains that dividing knowledge into 7 forms 
'shackles an understanding of mind, its development or the development 
of an adequate education'.
21 He therefore suggests that development 
of mind can be achieved within one form only.
,22 
He suggests that the forms of knowledge owe their origin and 
character to the nature and operation of the mental powers and that 
therefore 'understanding the development of the mental powers is the 
most fundamental development of mind' 
23  Furthermore, he suggests that 
'the logical differences between the domains spring from differences 
in the nature of objects towards which [the mind is turned]' .24 
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He strongly condemns the notion of Hirst that since 
understanding presupposes public standards then the public 'forms' are 
logically prior to the powers of mind. He posits that public standards 
reflect the nature of the mental powers on which they depend. If in 
this matter logical priority is taken to mean that it determined primacy 
in the order of reality, then Elliott concludes that the innate powers 
of mind 'are transformed into epiphenomena of their own achievements, 
and nothing is comprehensible any longer'. 25 
For Hirst, not only experience, but the mental powers themselves 
are wholly indefinite until they receive a structure from the 'forms'. 
Elliott rightly points out that it is impossible for an indefinite mind 
to receive a structure from public Forms. For the acquisition of this 
it is necessary to presuppose definite mental powers. 
These powers would have had an intelligible structure before 
they had developed the means for their own discovery and description. 
Elliott concludes therefore that we have to assume 'that the forms came 
into existence through the exercise of the mental powers.
.26 
Whether 
one should take an interest in Hirst's seven forms Elliott sees as a 
separate question, or as Lawton puts it, 'it is a matter of choosing 
between a simple classification and a complex one. 27 
Elliott however, chooses to question the right of Hirst to 
consider his 'forms' a theory of knowledge at all. He maintains, for 
instance that even if you accept Hirst's categorization of knowledge 
Hirst 'inadequately characterizes the forms' 
28 
 He believes the theory 
is inadequate because it only names the forms and makes it appear 'as 
if there is no such thing as empirical knowledge of persons
.29 
and 
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concludes 'at present nobody knows whether Hirst's contention ... is 
plausible or not because nobody knows what the names of his forms 
[specifically] refer tol. 30  
Pring also argues that Hirst's characterisation of a form is 
confused. He especially argues that Hirst's notion of a 'categoreal 
concept is faulty'. For example, while he agrees that Hirst's 
categoreal concepts for the physical sciences of 'space, time and 
cause' are valid, concepts such as 'God' (religion) and 'ought' 
(morals) are not fundamental in the same sense. 31 
This is so he maintains because whilst it is impossible to live 
outside a framework of space and time, it is possible to exist without 
a god and without ideas of what one ought to do. A system of morals 
that appraised persons rather than actions an0 listed virtues rather 
than duties Pring feels is entirely conceivable. 32 
However, I part company with Pring here since ultimately an 
appraisal of a person must be reduced to an appraisal of either what 
they do or what they stand for, both of which are dialectically 
reducible to Hirst's concept of 'ought'. 
Because Pring considers that the forms are not indispensable 
to thinking, then he feels they serve merely as defining terms for 'a 
kind of thinking'. If they are 'dispensable, but important' then he 
maintains they do not enter into any definition of distinctive and 
fundamental forms of knowledge. If so, he concludes, 'the whole notion 
of fundamental forms [is] redundant'.33 
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Lastly Pring argues that Hirst, in being more specific about 
the organisation of knowledge for curriculum purposes 'does not do 
justice to the complex differences between disciplined enquiries'. 34 
Hirst's scheme of things, he maintains, fails since it is not fully 
argued at the philosophical level and its articulation involves 'a 
confused notion of central organising or categorical concepts .35 and 
it imposes an ill-fitting framework within which to examine critically 
the many activities competing for a place in the curriculum. 
Pring is not alone in attacking Hirst's theory of forms 'status 
as a theory'. Brent too attacks it on these grounds. He argues that 
Hirst's failure to interpret reality using a transcendental theory of 
forms to produce 'a coherent view of objectivity' means 'there can be 
no justification for calling his account a theory of knowledge ... for 
the minimum conditions ... of a theory ... is (sic) that it does not 
simply describe but rather explains'. 36 Many choose, however, not to 
rebuke Hirst's theory in its entirety, but accept its principal 
features, choosing instead to query the status of this or that body 
of knowledge distinctive as a 'form'. The most commonly criticized 
of Hirst's forms are those of literature and the fine arts, history 
and the social sciences, religion and morality; however the criticisms 
are not all for the same reasons. They will be dealt with presently. 
Besides the seven forms of knowledge Hirst recognizes three 
other important classifications of knowledge: 
(A) 'Fields' of Knowledge 
(B) 'Fields' of Moral Knowledge 
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(C) 'Second order' forms of knowledge dependent on the other forms. 
These have already been described in chapter one of this 
discussion. 
In Hirst's view he sees history and the social sciences as 
logically complex, in part using truths that are a matter of empirical 
observation and experiment. However, he maintains they are not solely 
empirical but concerned with explanations in terms of intentions, will, 
hopes, beliefs and so on. Brent disagrees with Hirst's decision to 
consider them as logically autonomous largely because of 'the 
inadequacy of historical determinism ... to explain satisfactorily 
human behaviour'. 37 He does this because in the description and 
evaluation of human behaviour certain ethical judgements 'presuppose 
the possibility of human choice and decision
,38 
[unlike natural 
events]. 
Literature, the fine arts and religion Hirst regards as forms 
of knowledge only in so far as they involve expressions that have the 
features of true propositions. He considers that whether the arts are 
cognitive and a form of knowledge depends on whether or not artistic 
works themselves have features parallel to those of propositions with 
related objective tests. 
He does not perceive such features, as does Wittgenstein, who 
first suggested that works of art can be seen as symbolic expressions 
having meaning, simply because they have properties logically 
equivalent to those of propositions. He cites recent reconsideration 
of the concept of truth, which suggests that the notion of truth is 
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centrally a demand for objective judgements and there is no one 
particular form of such judgement. Hirst reasons therefore that since 
works of art can be judged in a manner logically equivalent to that 
appropriate to propositions then the arts are a distinct and unique 
form. 
He does not attempt to deny that art may have other functions 
besides propositional ones, say in relation to the expression of 
emotion or the creation of delight. Pring cannot accept this position 
at all. To begin with he cannot accept the notion of literature and 
the fine arts as a 'form' at all. He maintains that if by Hirst's 
definition of what constitutes a 'form' literature and the fine arts 
constitute a unique form of knowledge, then 'whatever counts as a piece 
of literature and whatever claims to be a work of art would have certain 
features in common which distinguishes (sic) them from all other kinds 
of Knowledge. 39 
By this argument, then Pring continues 'all works of art would 
be characterized by certain central organizing concepts and 
distinctive tests of truth. 
,40 
 This, he maintains, forces all creative 
and artistic activities to fit a very limiting framework which 
pre-defines what is acceptable art. 
He concludes, therefore, that this is quite inappropriate in 
terms of the curriculum. The problem as he sees it is that either works 
of art can be considered without reference to any outside 
'truth-criteria' or Hirst's idea of literature and the fine arts as 
a 'form' is wrong. Therefore artistic statements cannot be classed 
as 'propositional statements' but are statements to be experienced, 
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if I may continue Pring's logic, 'synnoetically' something which Hirst 
maintains is not possible except in terms of his truth criteria. 
In considering religion Hirst also recognizes that it has 
concerns beyond the mere pursuit of knowledge. Whilst some would 
question as to whether or not it could lay claim to being a logically 
distinct form of knowledge, Hirst takes its claim to knowledge 
seriously. 
Others would try to reduce it to knowledge belonging to other 
forms, he maintains, usually moral, historic or aesthetic, and the rest 
to be emotive in character. Hirst does not. He contends that it is 
unclear that one can coherently claim a logically unique domain of 
religious beliefs such that none of them can be known to be true, all 
being matters of faith. He maintains that the reason for this is that 
the meaning of religious propositions rests on a grasp of their 
truth-criteria for such propositions. 
If the propositions belong to a logically unique form their 
truth criteria must be unique. Religious propositions are only 
intelligible therefore to those who know those unique truth-criteria. 
The claim to an irreducible form of propositional meaning thus seems 
to necessitate to Hirst that at least some propositions of this kind 
be known to be true. If so there can only be a unique form of meaning 
if there is a unique form of knowledge, and the claim that religion 
involves a unique form of belief only is for Hirst incoherent. 
In this matter Phenix approaches the problem differently. He 
. sees religion as a 'major and unique way of looking at the world' and 
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therefore justifies it in these terms, not having to perform 
philosophical gymnastics to try and fit it into a theory. As such he 
gives it a far more Prominent position as a 'realm' than does Hirst. 
Lastly, although many would try and maintain that there are 
points common to all forms of Hirst's concept of knowledge, he would 
not see these as undermining his central thesis that the forms of 
knowledge are logically unique and mutually irreducible, forming a 
'bridge', of 'meaning', 'truth' and 'understanding' between the human 
'mind' and 'reality'. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPARISON OF 'FORMS' AND 'REALMS' IN TERMS OF THEIR MAIN 
IDEAS, ISSUES, NOTIONS AND CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
The principal points of comparison for 'Forms' and 'Realms' are 
their different concepts of 'meaning' and 'knowledge' or 
'understanding'. These lead to different theories regarding what 
should be included in the curriculum, and therefore different 
perceptions of 'liberal' or 'general' education and its relationship 
between 'mind' and 'reality'. 
Hirst acknowledges that Phenix's 'realms' provide the 
wherewithal for constructing a sophisticated curriculum, but argues 
that Phenix's basic categories are not basic enough to do the job that 
his own conception of 'forms' of knowledge can. He argues that the 
only legitimate basis for distinguishing between the different 
'realms' or 'forms' is by means of pointing to their different 
conceptual systems and different truth-criteria and not on the basis 
of Phenix's 'fact', 'form' or 'norm' criteria. He maintains that claims 
to the status of logically distinct domains of knowledge and all other 
claims to the meaning of knowing in essence can be reduced to one of 
his 'forms'. 
Lastly, a curriculum which initiates the student into each of 
his 'forms', Hirst contends, is justifiable purely on the basis of 
knowledge itself, whereas Phenix seeks to justify his curriculum in 
terms of the needs of society. 
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'Knowledge' and 'Meaning' 
From the previous chapter of this discussion it will be recalled 
that Phenix perceives 'meaning' as having four dimensions, briefly: 
(I) Inner experience, in which he includes reflectiveness, 
self-awareness and self-transcendence. 
(2) Rule, logic and principle, each type of meaning being defined by 
logic or principle. 
(3) Selective elaboration, theoretically limitless but with the only 
significant meanings being those with an inherent power of growth 
and elaboration, usually found in the world of disciplined 
scholarship. 
(4) Expression, by which Phenix means that meanings are not private 
property but communicable through symbols. 
By studying the logical patterns of the disciplines he divides 
them into nine generic classes of meaning which he obtains through 
pairing what he sees as the most important logical aspects of meaning, 
the three degrees of quantity: singular, general and comprehensive, 
and the three distinct qualitative aspects: fact, form and norm. 
Hirst takes Phenix's definition of meaning to task because he 
uses it not only to describe the processes of logical thinking, but 
existential states or what Martin Buber calls the 'I-Thou' 
relationship, described in chapter two of this discussion. He believes 
Phenix's concept of meaning is deficient because of 'a serious lack 
of clarity about what [he was] classifying in classifying the 'objects' 
of knowledge') 
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Hirst, it will be recalled from the previous chapter of this 
discussion, takes 'objects of knowledge' to mean the 'logical objects 
of knowledge when that state of mind is being distinguished from 
others'. 2 In this sense he sees there being three types of 'logical 
objects': knowledge with the direct object, 'knowledge-that' and 
'knowledge-how'. It is only 'knowledge-that' that he perceives as 
being pertinent to the thesis that the categories of meaning are 
fundamentally distinguishable as categories of knowledge. 
He considers that knowledge with the direct object should not 
be included as he considers all existential states to be reducible to 
concepts that are distinguishable within 'knowledge-that'. 
He is in partial accord with the quantitative aspects Phenix 
proposes but strongly disagrees with the qualitative aspect Phenix 
includes in his definition. For Hirst if it is the objects of knowledge 
that we are concerned with then all the propositions that are of 
interest to us must be true and therefore in at least one sense of that 
term state 'facts'. Phenix takes true statements of form and norm not 
to be statements of fact but to have other qualities. He therefore 
uses the term fact in a restricted way and Hirst is very critical of 
him for this. 
For Hirst Phenix's notion of 'form' is as unsatisfactory as his 
notion of 'fact' on the grounds that it picks out imagined 
possibilities, thereby distinguishing a feature that characterises the 
logical or formal truths of language, mathematics, philosophy and 
matters of aesthetic form. 
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Similarly he is critical of Phenix's idea of 'norm' because 
Phenix peculiarly associates it with ethics and gives it no explicit 
connection with aesthetics. Hirst therefore concludes that what Phenix 
means by his three qualitative aspects of meaning is too unclear for 
them to be used as a classificatory device and in particular he feels 
it is not obvious that they are mutually exclusive categories. Nor 
does he believe that every true proposition has one of these qualities 
unless 'fact' is taken to cover any and every proposition that might 
otherwise cause difficulties. 
As to the reasons why Phenix chose quantitative and qualitative 
aspects as the basis for the classification of meaning, of this Hirst 
is devastatingly critical. He asks the questions 'why these two?' - 
'why not use the concept of time?' All propositions make use of the 
concept of tense. 'Why not use the criteria of indicative and 
hypothetical or positive and negative?' 
He maintains that the reason is because Phenix relies heavily 
on 'certain traditional notions of logical differences without any 
reconsideration in the light of ... recent philosophical analysis. ' 3 
For Hirst if true propositions are to be classified as true and nothing 
else, then it must be 'by virtue of their logically necessary features 
and not by any other characteristics they may happen to have.' 4 As 
an example of what he means he uses the analogy of comparing means of 
transport. If this is what one is trying to do the criterion of colour 
is to vehicles as useless as quantity and quality are to meaning. 
He then suggests that the criteria that are necessary to there 
being true propositions are: concepts appropriately related in a 
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logical structure so that propositions can be formed and 
truth-criteria. He then infers that the quantitative aspect of 
knowledge is irrelevant to a logical classification of the objects of 
knowledge and argues for a more careful working out of the qualitative 
distinctions. 
He criticizes Phenix's use of the term 'objects of knowledge' 
as only if the term 'objects' is taken in the non-philosophical sense 
does Hirst feel it possible to assert that the domain of symbol ics is 
a distinct type of knowledge. He maintains that all knowledge requires 
symbols of some sort, without which it would not exist. He sees symbols, 
therefore, as the vehicles of knowledge rather than the basis of one 
type of knowledge. The reason he gives is that they no more designate 
a logically distinct domain than any other particular 'object' in a 
non-philosophical sense. 
Hirst is similarly critical of Phenix's realm of I synnoetics l . 
The focussing of non-propositional 'objects' and the defining concern 
for 'experience' both seem to Hirst to invalidate the claim to a 
logically distinct type of knowledge. A third unsatisfactory aspect 
he feels is the ambiguity of Phenix's use of the quantitative aspects 
of knowledge. He contends that only if the objects of knowledge are 
not taken as true propositions but as objects in the everyday sense, 
and 'singular' is taken to mean 'unique' or 'not communicable' can the 
domain of 'singular fact' be equated with what Phenix calls 
Isynnoetics'. 
However, Reid would find Phenix's realm still acceptable, as 
he would argue 'that form and content are apprehended directly as 
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aspects of one concrete whole and ... are not reducible to 
"knowledge-that". 5 
Hirst raises questions about Phenix's notion of quantity in what 
is said about the comprehensive types of knowledge. He argues that 
it is not at all true to claim that propositions about a totality of 
subjects are characteristic of historical knowledge, which he sees as 
more likely to be formed of singular statements. Further, he sees 
religion and philosophy as similarly so, though comprehensive in a 
different sense. He also can not understand why I symbolics' should 
be thought to be concerned with general propositions if that domain 
is to cover mathematics and non-discursive symbolic forms. 
All these difficulties Hirst sees as but the outcome of 
ambiguity over the objects of knowledge and appropriate classification 
criteria for them. He considers that what it is the notions of quantity 
and quality are being applied to is uncertain and the resulting meaning 
of Phenix's terms labelling the generic domains is unclear, especially 
since no effective rationale is given for reducing the nine classes 
to six. These Hirst is severely critical of, for Phenix sees them as 
pure, fundamental, archetypal and generic, in spite of the explicitly 
stated composite character of two of these. 
Hirst then raises five questions he would have liked Phenix to 
answer: 
(1) What is the status of the six 'realms'. 
(2) Are they categorically distinct in the Kantian sense? 
(3) Are they ultimate in some metaphysical sense? 
(4) Are the realms aboslute in that they cannot change? 
(5) Is it conceivable that new realms could arise? 
In attempting to read Phenix's mind Hirst contends that the 
academic disciplines man has developed are in no sense ultimate or 
absolute and their composite character is repeatedly emphasized. What 
strikes Hirst as strange is that the disciplines don't reflect more 
closely the distinct generic types of knowledge if all knowledge and 
meaning is to be located in such logically pure domains. Hence in his 
own theory he put forward the concepts of 'fields' of knowledge. 
Indeed he sees Phenix's allocation of the traditional 
disciplines as 'often unconvincing and even idiosyncratie 6 , and the 
reasons why each is listed where it is as 'often uneasily related to 
the theory that should be their basis. I . 7 
He feels it strange that the six realms have not been developed 
more extensively within their own terms. Indeed he asks what exactly 
Phenix considers the logical features of a discipline to be, whether 
all established areas of study are disciplines or only areas that 
concern themselves with developing one generic type of knowledge within 
the logical structure peculiar to it. He wonders aloud why those 
disciplines that express the types of knowledge in the purest forms 
are not the heart of Phenix's concerns. 
In comparison Hirst bases his concept of knowledge on the 
crucial significance of the fact that all aspects of meaning 
necessitate the use of concepts and it is only by virtue of 
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conceptualization that there is anything we can call meaning at all. 
He maintains that no concepts can be the basis of shared meaning without 
criteria for their application. The criteria for the application of 
a given concept he maintains are the criteria for the truth of 
statements that say that something is that given concept. 
In this way he determines that meaning necessitates concepts 
which necessitate truth criteria for propositions and statements. 
Thus, he infers the notions of meaning and true propositions and 
therefore meaning and knowledge are logically connected. 
Hirst concludes that if one is to talk of logically distinct 
realms of meaning one is in fact necessarily also talking about 
logically distinct types of truth-criteria and therefore of logically 
distinct forms of knowledge. 
These forms he argues can only be distinguished by examining 
the necessary features of true propositions and statements: the 
conceptual structures and the truth-criteria involved. On this basis 
he delineates his seven categorically distinct forms of meaning and 
knowledge. 
Brent would seriously object to this categorisation of knowlege 
in terms of a finite number of forms. He explains that what maintains 
the boundaries of knowledge (either within a 'form' or a 'realm') may 
and does change. 
He cites the example of how Riemann and Lobachevsky completely 
changed the logical processes of traditional geometry and how 'great' 
artists have generally been memorable as such because they have 
completely redefined the way to artistically perceive the world. 
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Furthermore, since the categories of history and sociology are 
al so in constant change (not to mention the physical sciences) then 
this seriously undermines both Hirst's notion of imutable 'forms' and 
Phenix's concept of six 'realms' and opens up the possibility of a 
potentially limitless number of categories of knowledge. 8 
However, although Hirst originally conceived of his forms as 
finite in number, in 1975 at a symposium of leading educational 
philosophers he reconsidered his position stating 
'I would certainly not argue that there is some 
universally agreed number ... of forms ... neither more 
nor less' nor 'that any distinctions we may make between 
forms ofa understanding have any absolute or Platonic 
status' 
The similarities between his seven forms and Phenix's six realms 
are limited. Three of the realms, empirics, esthetics and ethics, Hirst 
acknowledges since he considers them 'distinguishable 
proposi tional ly on criteria he and Phenix share. Symbolics, 
synnoetics and synoptics are for Hirst I mischaracterised areas, none 
of which is in fact a fundamental category of meaning and knowledge, 
all being complex in nature. 11° 
For Hirst it is because Phenix has not recognized the full 
implications of the fact that the logical categorisation of all meaning 
reduces to the categorisation of true propositions that he seeks to 
classify at one go a domain of both propositions and existential 
experiences, 'thereby confusing the whole operation' .11 
'Forms' and 'Realms' 
Exploring the similarities and differences between the 'forms' 
and 'realms' at a more detailed level it becomes clear that despite 
the fact that Hirst has a much more elegant perception than Phenix of 
the fundamental processes of meaning even his theory is not without 
its problems. 
Mathematics  
Although Hirst and Phenix have many disagreements their 
arguments are remarkably similar in this domain. Hirst sees 
mathematics as a unique discipline in the sense that it follows the 
four criteria mentioned in chapter one that he considers essential for 
a form to be distinct and irreducible, namely: 
(1) Certain central concepts peculiar to it. 
(2) A distinctive logical structure ordering its concepts and 
relations between them. 
(3) Distinctive methods of enquiry 
He considers the third criterion to be of crucial importance. 
Phenix perceives mathematics as just one of the disciplines 
making up his 'realm' of symbolics. He argues that as a discipline 
it is identifiable by its representative ideas and their structure 
(Hirst's (1) and (2)), the methods of enquiry and testing that it 
employs (Hirst's (3) and (4)) and its subject matter, which Ruthven 
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sees as effectively reducible to Hirst's (1) above at some theoretical 
level.
12 
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Ruthven criticizes both Hirst and Phenix because there is 
ambiguity about whether the definition of a discipline which is being 
used is indeed a 'logical' one based on distinctions between the 
truth-criteria used to evaluate propositions and theories, rather than 
a 'social' one which identifies disciplines with some historical 
tradition of enquiry and activity, or a 'commonsense' one which tacitly 
reflects elements of both.
13 
He does this because in the case of Hirst, Hirst deals with the 
problem of demarcating disciplines by arguing for a logical definition 
making distinctions on the basis of truth-criteria. On other occasions 
Hirst appears to use a 'commonsense' definition not strictly founded 
on logical criteria. An example Ruthven gives is Hirst's explanation 
of the development of mind into seven or eight 'distinguishable 
cognitive structures. 
 14 
Similarly Ruthven criticizes Phenix for employing both logical 
and social criteria in such statements as 
'the general test for a discipline is that it be the 
characteristic activity of an identifiable organized 
tradition of men of Knowledge, that is of persons who 
are skilled in certain specified functions that they oop 
able to justify by a set of intelligible standards.'lp 
As a concrete example of this abiguity Ruthven cites the case 
of arithmetic, which both Hirst and Phenix regard as part of 
mathematics. However, Ruthven asks the question 'in what sense are 
the arithmetic propositions that we learn, construct and use dependent 
on reductions from axioms.
,16 
Rather, he argues, we use a number of 
geometric and physical analogies (such as the number line) and rules 
of calculation to construct and test arithmetic statements. 
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Although he says it might be argued that while we do not actually 
construct and test arithmetic propositions in such a manner, their 
truth is in some ultimate sense dependent on their deducibility from 
some set of axioms. This argument can only be sustained, he maintains, 
at the expense of the meaningfulness and applicability of arithmetic 
propositions. 
Further, he claims, such an argument would be incompatible with 
Hirst's claim that 'it is quite impossible to learn facts, to know them 
as facts, without acquiring the basic conepts and criteria for truth 
involved.
,17 
Ruthven then continues that while it is part of our 
commonsense knowledge that arithmetic is part of mathematics, it does 
not satisfy the logical criterion for inclusion in the discipline of 
mathematics and thus here logic conflicts with common sense. 
He maintains therefore that to adopt the logical definition of 
mathematics which Hirst and Phenix advance is 'to exclude virtually 
all of what is, and has been, commonly termed mathematics.' 18 All, 
he asserts, Phenix and Hirst do, therefore, is not accomplish a 
'description' of mathematics as a 'redefinition'. On the other hand, 
Brent accepts the mathematical category of knowledge on the basis that 
the relationship of what he calls the categorial concepts (number, 
measurement, deduction) and the substantive concepts (angles, 
logarithms, sets) is assymetrical.19 
In conclusion, Ruthven argues that it is a contingent social 
fact, rather than a logical necessity, that has led to the tradition 
of enquiry commonly known as 'mathematics' developing a concern for 
logical structure and becoming popularly associated with that concern. 
He feels therefore that Hirst and Phenix have missed the point. 
Physical Sciences  
Whereas Hirst makes a clear distinction between the physical 
and social sciences on the basis of their central concepts Phenix 
includes both in his second realm of 'empirics'. However, at no stage 
does Hirst make it absolutely clear just why the central concepts of 
the social sciences are different to those of the physical sciences 
or indeed just what their nature is in the first place. 
Both men are at least agreed that the physical sciences are 
concerned with matters of fact and being able to formulate valid general 
descriptions of matters of fact. Phenix offers a far more detailed 
explication than Hirst of just what is involved in the physical science 
disciplines. They are, he argues, essentially constituted of 
generalizations or hypotheses, which through careful observation and 
experimentation are tested and revised as new generalizations, 
theories or 'laws'. This process, he argues, is never complete. 
'Conventions are never true or false; they are only more or less 
convenient or appropriate to specified purposes. 120 
The Human Sciences 
As explained above, whereas Phenix includes the social sciences 
with the physical sciences in his realm of empirics, Hirst considers 
them a distinct 'form' of knowledge. In his view the social sciences 
are logically complex, in part using truths that are a matter of 
empirical observation and experiment, in part concerned with 
explanations in terms of intentions, will, hopes, beliefs and other 
immeasurable entities on which experiments can not be made. Phenix 
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is also of the view that the social sciences differ markedly from the 
physical sciences; however, he feels that their concern for observation 
and generalization is sufficient overlap with the physical sciences 
to include both in the realm of empirics. This writer feels otherwise 
as there are far more differences than similarities especially in the 
area of formulating generalisations, rules and principles. 
Literature and the Fine Arts 
It would seem that in the aesthetic domain there is probably 
the least conflict between Hirst and Phenix. Hirst feels strongly that 
they constitute knowledge which is a unique form. He feels they 'have 
a significance that parallels the shape and sound of the words and 
sentences we use in making statements about the physical world.
,21 
The 
observable features of each of the aesthetic forms, he argues, are used 
as symbols, having meaning, which can be seen as making artistic 
statements and judged true and false as words and statements can be 
used to make scientific statements. However, he argues that as artistic 
statements they state truths which cannot be communicated again in the 
same way. 
Phenix sees the main feature of the aesthetic meanings as being 
their 'particularity' • 22 The object of knowledge he sees as the 'single 
particular form', which is 'essentially ... incomparable'. In this 
way therefore he argues one should not think in terms of music, art, 
literature and so on, but in terms of individual musical works, artistic 
works, literary works and so one, as they are not reducible to any other 
form. The media through which the artistic statements are made can 
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be examined and described, but the statements themselves are only 
partially expressible through other forms. Both Hirst and Phenix, 
however, fall into the trap of concentrating too much on the idea of 
the aesthetic category of knowlege in terms of propositions. Brent 
and Pring quite rightly criticize this characterisation as neglecting 
the much more real, creative and enjoyable aspect of learning how rather 
than learning that.
23 
History, Religion and Philosophy  
Whereas Hirst sees these three 'forms' as unique and 
categorically distinct from one another, Phenix sees them as but one 
comprehensive 'realm' - synoptics. 
Phenix gives as his reasons for this the fact that all three 
of his 'sub-realms' have an integrative function, uniting meanings from 
all the realms into a unified perspective, and that they share the one 
fundamental purpose of synoptic understanding, differing only in the 
manner in which they effect the intended integration. 
Using Hirst's criteria of logical differences and distinct 
truth criteria it is easy to see why he separates them, for if one were 
to affect an understanding of a phenomenon such as the Reformation then 
despite the fact that one would be using 'synoptic' logical and 
truth-criteria, distinctly different 'historical' or 'religious' or 
l philsophicall understandings could be achieved. 
Hirst's claims for history being a categorically distinct 
'form' are based on his view of history in a similar way to his view 
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of social science: that is that it is logically complex, using truths 
that are a matter of empirical observation and experiment and concerned 
with explanations in terms of intentions, will, hopes, beliefs and so 
on. 
Phenix's view of history seems self-contradictory, for on the 
one hand he acknowledges that its subject matter is distinct, namely 
'what happened in the human events of the past', and that its methods 
of enquiry, namely investigating the factual evidence of the past, are 
also distinct along with the logical concepts of the discipline, namely 
forming hypotheses about particular events using relevant facts, 
personal understanding and ethical insight and constantly revising and 
improving these in the light of new evidence. However, on the other 
hand he refuses to acknowledge it as a unique 'realm', even though by 
his own criteria it would be one. 
Hirst's view that religion is categorically distinct in a 
Kantian sense has already been explained in the previous chapter of 
this discussion. Phenix views it as a unique sub-realm but not as a 
unique realm, though as with his concept of hisrtory he contradicts 
himself, as all the criteria he puts forward for consideration of 
religion as a sub-realm are the same criteria he uses elsewhere for 
considering certain disciplines as 'realms'. In the case of religion 
the subject matter he puts forward is the concept of l ultimacy l . The 
methods of gaining religious understanding he proposes are prayer, 
meditation, active commitment and ritual practices. The logical 
concepts he includes are 'Truth', 'God', 'Goodness', 'Evil', 
'Perfection', 'Holiness' and 'Salvation'. 
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Philosophy forms a similar problem for Hirst and Phenix to 
history and religion. They are both in agreement as to what the content, 
methods and concepts of the discipline are, though Hirst would add 
truth-criteria. However, Hirst considers it to be a distinct 'form' 
whilst Phenix only considers it to be a 'sub-realm'. 
Hirst takes philosophy above all to be concerned with 
'clarification of the concepts and propositions through which our 
experience and activities are intelligible.' 20 He perceives it as 
interested in answering questions about the meaning of terms and 
expressions, about the logical relations and the pre-suppositions 
these terms and expressions involve. As he regards it, it is a 
'distinctive type of higher order pursuit' with the aim of 
understanding all the concepts used in forms of 'lower-order knowledge 
and awareness.
al 
Phenix sees it as 'concerned with every kind of human 
experience' with the distinctive function of 'interpretation of 
meaning 1 . 22 Hence, he and Hirst are not in disagreement over its 
essential features. However, the fact that he describes its methods 
and logical concepts [dialectic, analysis, evaluation and synthesis] 
as distinct from those of history and religion, undermines his 
contention that it is only a 'sub-realm'. 
'Realms' not considered by Hirst as categorically distinct 
Hirst does not consider Phenix's symbolic 'sub-realms' of 
ordinary language and non-discursive symbolic forms to be distinct 
'forms' of meaning, but as simply the media through which knowledge 
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is expressed. These symbols are not expressible as propositions and 
thus have neither logic, nor truth-criteria in Hirst's scheme of things 
and thus totally fail to be acceptable as distinct 'forms'. 
Phenix's realm of synnoetics has already been considered 
elsewhere in this discussion and although he considers the fifth of 
Phenix . 's realms to be a 'form', Hirst does not believe that there is 
an identifiably distinct discpline for ethical education. This Hirst 
believes is because invariably ethics comes into play in 'fields' such 
as political, legal and educational theory, but no specialised 
subdivisions of moral knowledge have developed. Moral questions he 
believes only ever arise alongside matters of fact and technique. 
'Liberal Education' and 'General Education' - Their Justification  
Hirst's 'liberal education' and Phenix's 'general education' 
are both intended as 'bridges' between 'mind' and 'reality', yet their 
justifications are totally different. Hirst's justification is solely 
in terms of the nature of knowledge itself. For Hirst the pursuit of 
rational knowledge pre-supposes some form of commitment to what one 
is seeking to justify. Justification is possible he maintains only 
if what is being justified is both intelligible under publicly rooted 
concepts and is assessable according to accepted criteria. It assumes 
a commitment to those two principles, he argues. 
However, those very principles he proposes are in fact 
fundamental to the pursuit of knowledge in all its forms. The forms, 
he maintains, are in a sense simply the working out of these general 
principles in particular ways. This apparent circularity Hirst 
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contends is the result of the inter-relationship of the concepts of 
rational justification and the pursuit of knowledge. 
It is because it is based on these ultimate principles that for 
Hirst a 'liberal education' is the ultimate form of education in a very 
real sense. 
Phenix's justification uses no such philosophical 
sophistication. As far as he is concerned 'general education' is 
justifiable only in terms of a number of value-judgements related to 
contemporary society. He sees an 'abyss of meaninglessness' which is 
the result of the conditions of modern industrial civilization. .23 
This he wishes to overcome. To counteract the four contributing factors 
to this of: 
(1) The spirit of criticism and skepticism. 
(2) Pervasive depersonalization and fragmentation caused by the 
extreme specialization of a complex, interdependent society. 
(3) The sheer mass of knowledge modern man is required to assimilate. 
(4) The rapid rate of change of modern life. 
Phenix proposes that the school curriculum be based squarely 
on the nature of meaning. By this he means his 'realms of meaning', 
the six patterns of meaning he designates as symbolics, empirics, 
esthetics, synnoetics, ethics and synoptics, which have already been 
considered in this discussion. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRICULUM 
Introduction 
Despite the fact that both Hirst and Phenix argue vigorously 
for a curriculum based on what each perceives as the fundamental 'ways 
of knowing', neither man wishes to construct a school curriculum based 
entirely on the 'forms' or 'realms'. Hirst considers that the 'fields' 
of knowledge are often as important as the 'forms' depending on the 
special needs of the society children are being educated for, and so 
long as the 'forms' within the 'fields' are made clear. 
Phenix feels strongly that a curriculum based solely on his 
realms would be seriously deficient. He argues that a curriculum needs 
to be responsive to the particular specialized needs of a given society 
as well as the need to educate its children in all the fundamental 
patterns of meaning. 
Neither man tries to argue fora curriculum where the categories 
of knowledge have the same status and functions as 'subjects' or 
'disciplines' in the traditional sense. Both freely admit to the 
importance of other powerful factors in the curriculum. 
Phenix and Hirst both consider that physical education should 
be a vital part of the school curriculum, and although he does not 
consider that disciplines have evolved from the 'form' that Phenix 
calls 'ethics' Hirst believes that moral education for the sake of the 
improvement of society should be a fundamental part of the curriculum. 
Since there is no separate discipline of moral knowledge Hirst would 
prefer that as moral questions arise alongside matters of fact and 
technique they should be answered in that context at that time. 
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Then what is the true impact of a categoreal perception of 
knowledge? Firstly, there is an added emphasis on ways of thinking 
rather than the subject matter of a discipline being seen as the primary 
focus. 
Secondly, certain subjects are considered to have paradigmic 
status since they are considered to more clearly demonstrate the 
categories of knowledge. There are many critics of this sort of 
'skewing' away from certain subjects in favour of others. Pring in 
particular considers this to be logically absurd. 
He feels that to maintain that physics is a better paradigm 
example of the natural sciences than botany is ridiculous. He asks, 
'[how are] the logical features of a 'form' decided independently of 
the choice of paradigms. How else would we know what a paradigm is 
a paradigm of.' 1 
Thus he maintains that to argue that a botanist's studies were 
simply 'a pale reflection of a form of knowledge best exemplified in 
physics is to misunderstand what he is doing. ' 2 He concludes in the 
absence of an a priori argument for a limited number of categories of 
knowledge then there is no logical reason for a non-proliferation of 
these depending on the choice of paradigms. 3 
Nevertheless, whilst Hirst considers subjects like these to 
have no status as 'forms' he sees them as highly justifiable and can 
'see no reason why such organisations of knowledge ... should not be 
endlessly constructed according to particular theoretical or practical 
interests.
A 
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This is thus an open-ended view of knowledge, a moving away from 
the concept of the curriculum as an immersion in the features of the 
seven 'forms' or six 'realms', and far from the 'dangerously narrow' 
position that Hirst has been accused of by Soltis and others. 
Furthermore, this and Phenix's theory are two theories of 
liberal education, not of specialist education and are really only 
promoting the concept of making young minds aware of and capable of 
using the different ways of looking at the world. They do not attempt 
to deny a place to the elements of interest, child psychology and other 
recognised educational considerations. 
It is the aim of this final chapter therefore simply to explore 
the implications for the 'liberal' or 'general' education aspect of 
the curriculum of its being based on the 'ways of knowing'. These 
implications will be dealt with in terms of: 
(I) The scope of the curriculum. 
(2) The logic of sequencing the disciplines. 
(3) The logical aspects of teaching a subject. 
(4) Developmental factors in the sequence of studies. 
(5) The problem of selection in the curriculum. 
(6) The use of the disciplines. 
(7) Representative ideas. 
(8) Methods of enquiry. 
(9) The appeal to imagination. 
1. The Scope of the Curriculum 
Phenix believes that individual student personalities, the 
socio-cultural context of the student and the available school and 
community resources are the most important factors which decide what 
a student needs to know and what the appropriate scope is of the course 
of study that ought to be provided. 
In order to maximize the meanings in a course of study he lists 
five principal ways in which this can be accomplished: 
(a) Through mastery: He considers that the meaningful life is that 
in which the person finds one thing to do and learns to do very 
well, and the realization of this comes in depth of understanding. 
(b) Through belonging to a community: Whereas he maintains mastery 
requires specialization to achieve satisfaction, the second point 
of view, that personal fulfillment comes from belonging to a 
community, leads to a course of study which depends upon a person's 
place within the social complex. Each individual he believes 
should play his part and be required to develop skills that will 
equip him to contribute to the society. In general, therefore, 
he does not feel an individual should need to cultivate meanings 
in other than the special sphere in which he serves the community. 
In this type of curriculum Phenix maintains there is special 
provision for understanding the nature of the society as a whole. 
(c) Through many-sidedness: This is a third answer for Phenix to the 
question of fulfillment. The desirable goal he believes is a 
well-rounded education with a variety of interests. This is 
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achieved via a curriculum which is broad and diverse. Rather than 
developing one skill to a high level, the student should be 
encouraged to gain a number of different competences. 
(d) Through the integrity of the person: The aim he feels should be 
to secure a coordination of whatever meanings are acquired into 
a coherent whole. From this standpoint the most important 
consideration he argues is that the studies do not form a 
collection of unrelated pieces, but an interrelated whole. 
(e) Through gaining a certain quality of understanding: This ideal 
he maintains is that rather than through depth, participation, 
extensiveness or coherence, through what it is deemed essential 
to know, whether a few things or many, fulfillment is realized. 
Of course Phenix points out the above five positions are by no 
means mutually exclusive. Indeed since study often continues over many 
years, sometimes for the greater part of a lifetime in the long run 
he considers it would be possible to achieve fulfillment in all of the 
above ways. 
Needless to say, Phenix would argue that a curriculum should 
include all of his six realms while Hirst would wish his seven forms 
to be included. These would satisfy the requirements for the 
fulfillment of the qualitative criterion and the criteria of wholeness 
and many-sidedness. 
Pring and Brent, of course, would argue that this would only 
be of 'knowledge-that' and not of 'knowledge-how'. It is up to the 
curriculum designer to answer this objection. 
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As for mastery and belonging, Phenix argues that concentration 
on mastering one field does not exclude concern for anything else. 
Indeed he maintains that they are such that 'all of them are required 
if a person is to achieve the highest excellence in anything at all: 5 
However, it is doubtful if moral understanding is essential for mastery 
of mathematics or religious understanding essential for mastery of 
ordinary language. Certainly the 'realms' or 'forms' do overlap in 
their significance for one another in some of the ways of knowing, but 
it is doubtful that they are as essential for mastery as Phenix would 
As for fulfillment through communal participation, a person 
cannot understand his place in the whole unless he is aware of the basic 
understandings of civilized man. Thus, a knowledge of all the meanings 
would seem essential for this criterion as well. 
Unless mastery in the symbolic realms of ordinary language and 
mathematics is conceived as the sole means to fulfillment, then a 
programme for a secondary curriculum of 'liberal' or 'general' 
education may then be conceived as providing for instruction in all 
of the fundamental types of meaning over a period of four to six years. 
What these fundamental types would be would depend on the perception 
of the individual planner; however, this writer feels that to be fair 
to both Hirst and Phenix that Phenix's 'realms' perhaps in the guise 
of Hirst's 'fields' would be more or less up to the task. These would 
be accompanied by some opportunity for concurrent specialization where 
individual abilities, interests and social needs indicate its 
desirability. 
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Phenix feels that a well-balanced programme would have to be 
divided approximately equally between the types of meaning to offer 
variety, and to satisfy the criterion of fulfillment of richness and 
breadth of understanding as well as the other criteria discussed 
earlier. Of course the curriculum would also have to take into account 
the character, traditions and history of the community as well as the 
predispositions of its students. A general philosophy can only 
indicate the overall picture and certain principles for making 
decisions about sequencing and the selection and organization of 
materials for instruction would have to be established. 
2. The logic of sequencing the disciplines  
The sequencing of the order of studies is not governed by any 
'law' of nature. Sequencing therefore tends to be arbitrary, unless 
the materials to be learned are logically interdependent. Then a 
certain ordering is necessary. 
Logically the realm of symbolics has priority over all the other 
types of knowledge, despite Hirst's objections that it is not a 'form'. 
Current research suggests that failure to draw attention to the 
linguistic aspects involved in all of the subjects taught in a school 
(and, one might add, the other symbolic aspects) is to retard the 
progress of many students in gaining understanding. 
On a philosophical level one cannot express empirical, ethical, 
literary or synoptic meanings without discursive symbolisms. Hirst's 
reduction of works of art to propositional statements with their own 
distinctive truth-criteria implies the need for discursive wmbolisms 
to 'translate' their meaning. 
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Theoretically a student should be thoroughly grounded in the 
meanings of the symbolic realm before he or she begins the secondary 
curriculum, but the idea that one can dispense with it or downplay its 
significance at the secondary level is something done at the educator's 
peril. 
For this reason the symbolic disciplines should continue to be 
offered side by side with all the 'forms' that Hirst categorizes, 
history, religion and philosophy being held back as subjects until the 
student acquired an experience of dealing with empirical data for 
history, language, truth, beauty, being and goodness (as elements in 
a vision of ultimacy) for religion, and a comprehensive world of 
meanings to analyze, evaluate and synthesize for philosophy. 
Ideally, topics in all the subject offerings would have to be 
introduced only after the prerequisites to their proper understanding 
have been mastered. In many cases logical prerequisites could be 
offered directly in association with the topics for which they were 
needed. For example, certain phases in mathematics could be offered 
in connection with the study of those science topics for which they 
were required. 
Besides the logic of sequencing each of the domains of 
knowledge, it would be necessary to also consider the logical factors 
in the sequences of study within each domain. At the secondary level 
Phenix argues that physics is the most fundamental science, since it 
deals with matter and energy. The biological, psychological and social 
sciences he considers less fundamental in the sense that they deal with 
more limited classes of things. However, as mentioned in chapter four 
of this discussion this need not necessarily be the case. 
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Among the arts no clear order of precedence is discernible, 
though a case could be made for the logical priority of the arts of 
movement, on the grounds that sensitivity to bodily movement is a 
prerequisite to full understanding of rhythms in music and drama, of 
tensions and balances in the visual arts, and of metre and cadence in 
poetry. For the most part however, each art could develop 
independently. 
The three synoptic disciplines could all develop independently, 
though if any one should develop first it should be history, for all 
three of history, philosophy and religion make use of the past. 
The third and most important aspect of logical sequencing 
concerns the order of learning within particular disciplines. If a 
topic of study is simply a collection of isolated items, obviously there 
is no inherent logical order. On the the other hand, if there is an 
orderly pattern of inter-related items the teacher must order them so 
that the logic behind the ordering of each individual item is that each 
item be understood in terms of what precedes it. In other words, one 
should proceed from the simple to the complex. 
3. The Logical Aspects of Teaching a Subject 
Hirst considers that the effective teaching of a subject, 
whether it be a 'form' or a 'field' involves 
'knowing certain features which characterize it, which 
can be disclosed only by logical analysis ... though once 
the criteria for this are plain, empirical evidence 
about thinking bpsed on the use of these criteria becomes 
important too.'° 
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Further, he considers that it is a necessary truth about all 
forms of knowledge that there is some ordered sequence to the truths 
concerned and this being so if the grounds of validity for propositions 
are to be understood by pupils, then the teaching of the area of 
knowledge must reflect these logical priorities in the order of 
justification. 
He believes that far too much has been made of empirical 
investigation of teaching methods and that much more careful 
examination of what the logically necessary features of areas of 
knowledge are would be more likely to lead to better teaching. 
By ordering the terms and concepts of a given subject such that 
the meaning of certain terms and concepts presupposes the meaning of 
others, he feels a pupil's understanding of any 'form' or 'field' would 
be facilitated. 
An understanding of the meaning of terms he proposes is not 
necessarily built up in any strict order. Concepts, he contends, are 
acquired by learning the complex use of terms in relation to other terms 
and their application in particular cases. A subject's logical 
'grammar' and the order within it must be respected, he believes, in 
all teaching methods. However, he suggests this still leaves a vast 
area in which experimental investigations about the effectiveness of 
different methods can, and he feels, must be carried out. I agree with 
him. 
Any subject like history or physics or mathematics he considers 
is based on the use of certain logical principles in terms of which 
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the explanation and theories distinctive of the subject are validated. 
He refers to the logic of historical explanations of scientific 
explanations, mathematical proofs and so on. These principles, 
however, he does not suggest determine only one logical sequence for 
the propositions. Therefore any teaching method for the subject he 
infers must respect the fundamental logical principles without which 
no understanding of the distinctive form of validity peculiar to the 
subject is possible. Thus, he continues, this means that some 'logical 
ordering of propositions using these logical principles must emerge 
in the teaching of the subject'. There are alternative logical 
sequences which may be taken, he suggests, and advances in knowledge 
often suggest new sequences. 
Hirst maintains that to say that some logical sequence must 
emerge in the teaching of a subject is not to say that the teaching 
must follow that sequence in temporal order. He considers that it is 
an order that is understood to hold together in the end and does not 
have to be built up in any one way. 
The logical grammar involved and the various possibilities for 
the logical sequence to be followed he strongly feels are matters for 
analytical determination rather than empirical investigation. How far 
these logical features do determine the teaching of a subject, and areas 
within the subject, he considers can only be worked out in detail in 
terms of the specific content to be taught. 
It is only when the fullest logical analysis of what is involved 
in teaching a subject has been carried out that Hirst believes a 
profitable empirical investigation of methods can be conducted. 
106 
Hirst considers that as for the psychological aspects of 
teaching a subject, to make a distinction between logical and 
psychological organisation of knowledge is to misunderstand the nature 
of knowledge. There is no such thing as a non-logical organisation 
of knowledge, he feels. Dewey's idea that if someone acquires knowledge 
this is necessarily a personal psychological matter he agrees with, 
as he feels a person cannot have non-psychologically-organised 
knowledge. The contrast between the logical and psychological aspects 
of teaching he considers is only between the different organisations 
of knowledge which are presented to children, respecting both the 
logical features of the knowledge concerned and the necessity for the 
pupils to individually come to acquire this knowledge. 7 
To sustain interest by teaching elements from what Hirst calls 
the 'primary divisions' of knowledge, such as physics, mathematics, 
history or religion, he considers would be next to impossible. 
However, he feels that by teaching what he calls 'second order fields' 
such as 'the neighbourhood', 'power' or 'the seventeenth century mind' 
the interest of pupils may be aroused and they may therefore learn more 
effectively. The pupils' grasp of the meaning and validity of all the 
elements in such a second order organisation he proposes depends on 
their appreciating these elements as logically related to other 
elements within the primary divisions of knowledge. The distinction 
here then is about what is taught and not logical questions. As such 
he feels it can not be settled on philosophical grounds. 
4. Developmental Factors in the Sequence of Studies  
In addition to logical factors, the findings of developmental 
psychology can be used to help decide the order of studies. At every 
stage of a child's development the nature of the person affects what 
can and cannot be learned and how easily this can be done. It is patently 
absurd to suggest that for instance philosophy could be taught to a 
child at kindergarten in a satisfactory and satisfying way. 
The possibilities of learning depend on the maturation of the 
child. Thus knowledge of mathematical sequences provides one type of 
clue to the order of studies. Maturation determines the limit of 
expected achievement and to a considerable extent determines the speed 
of learning. 
Besides maturation the possibilities of learning are decided 
by previous learning. Thus emerges the developmental concept of 
readiness, which refers to the condition of being optimally prepared 
for some particular learning experience. The ideal order of studies 
is one in which each experience is introduced at the most propitious 
time in the person's development, that is as soon as he is ready for 
it. 
This concept is really an aspect of what Phenix calls 'the more 
fundamental principle of maximum economy in learning', since he feels 
human beings can be made ready for learning that does not fit any 
standard readiness schedule.
8 
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How well a person learns is greatly influenced by the factor 
of motivation. If one has powerful needs or desires to fill, one quickly 
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learns how to satisfy them. To some degree these motives for learning 
can be controlled by rewards and punishments, but from personal 
experience it is this writer's contention that interesting and varied 
lessons are the best remedy for the unmotivated child, since the 
experience is more emjoyable than the knowledge within it which one 
is trying to impart. Thus, the experience is its own reward. 
In planning the sequence of studies a basic developmental 
principle is that of continuity. Each step in the learning process 
must fit into previous steps to forma consistent whole. The successive 
experiences in learning should therefore be sufficiently different to 
provide stimulus for growth, but not so strange as to be incoherent. 
Although it is possible to plan curricula in the light of studies 
in human development, it is only in broad terms that the kinds of 
experience appropriate to children and young people at successive 
periods in their development can be estimated. 
In using knowledge from the field of human development Phenix 
believes that a threefold distinction should be kept in mind, namely, 
the distinction between what he terms 'actuality', 'possibility' and 
'ideality'. By this he means that developmental enquiries yield 
knowledge of how certain people have 'actually' developed. However, 
he considers this knowledge may be inadequate for making curriculum 
decisions as the conditions of growth may not have been optimal.
9 
Further, enquiries may reveal that under certain conditions 
specified learnings are possible. However, the demonstration of 
•possibility is no guarantee of ideality, he feels, as it does not follow 
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from the fact that a person can learn something at a given stage in 
his growth that he ought to learn it then. 
At the developmental stage of adolescence, the stage 
encompassing the secondary period of education, Phenix considers the 
search for individuality to be uppermost. He quotes the psychoanalyst 
Erik Erikson in Childhood and Society, who perceives the main task in 
adolescence as achieving a sense of identity, by internalizing and 
integrating the various social roles in which one is cast.
10 
However, 
at the same time he feels that trust, autonomy, initiative and industry 
are continuing aspects of personal growth that are important, together 
with, in some pupils, a development of intimacy, in which the person 
learns to find fulfillment by losing himself in loving others. 
What this suggests is that some students may not be capable of 
realizing mature understanding of self and others, of moral insight 
and integrative perspectives during adolescence, which points to the 
need for continuing general education throughout life in these areas. 
Phenix proposes that it may be that the average person can profit most 
fully from such studies only after assuming adult roles rather than 
during secondary school. As such curriculum planners need to be aware 
of the limitations of the 'realms' or the 'forms' in the secondary 
school. 
5. The Problem of Selection in the Curriculum 
The problem of choosing what to teach is generated by the 
conditions of modern advanced civilisation. Knowledge has not only 
increased dramatically in the space of a few generations but is still 
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accelerating its increase. The solution to the 'knowledge explosion' 
is becoming aware of the essential basis of all knowledge 'forms' or 
'realms'. Through promoting 'general' or 'liberal' education at the 
secondary level human existence can have its fundamental meanings 
restored. 
The means to this end is via careful selection of material s based 
on the use of the disciplines, representative ideas and methods from 
them and stimulation of the imagination of the students through 
imaginative teaching. 
6. The Use of the Disciplines  
Phenix's first principle for the selection of the material for 
instruction is that all of it should be drawn from the organized 
scholarly disciplines. To distinguish between the consequential and 
the trivial he suggests analyzing the social sources of knowledge in 
advanced civilization, namely the groups of scholars who by their 
separate endeavours constantly shape and reshape each of the 
disciplines. 
The special office of the teacher, he contends, is to mediate 
the knowledge of the specialized scholars to the students he teaches 
and thus reveal the general human relevance of this knowledge. The 
teacher he sees as the 'humanizer of knowledge', a person who selects 
materials from the disciplines that are also within the grasp of his 
students to understand and who teaches, explains and directs students 
to the meanings which they hold. 
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To achieve this he suggests not narrow, single discipline-
related subjects, but broad multi-disciplinary subjects such as social 
science which could encompass the disciplines of history, economics, 
sociology and so on, or general science, which could encompass biology, 
physics and chemistry. 'Modern Civilisation' he suggests could 
encompass art, music, literature and the arts of movement. In this 
of course he is no different from Hirst with his 'fields'. 
However, he is quite firm that within these multi-disciplinary 
subjects that the individual concepts and methods should be emphasized 
rather than shallow, non-disciplined thinking. 
As an example of what he means, he suggests the topic 'The 
American Indian'. Rather than approaching the subject as an odd 
assortment of facts he suggests the study could be made from the 
standpoint of art, music, religion and so on. 
Further, he proposes that every discipline should not be ashamed 
to make use of materials from other disciplines. Hence, he suggests 
a course in the problems of democracy might be organized in terms of 
the moral standards involved in responsible decision-making. 
Apart from these suggestions he does not believe there are any 
definitive rules for organizing the subject matter for instruction, 
but proposes that if each individual teacher organized his material 
in terms of what was personally most meaningful, then this would be 
more likely to be intelligible to the students and they would respond 
better to his teaching. 
7. Representative Ideas  
Phenix contends that the second most important principle for 
selection of material is that it exemplify the representative ideas 
of the disciplines. These he feels should reveal the essence of the 
discipline and in no way be minor or subordinate. They are elements 
of the subject that stand for the whole or important aspects of it and 
epitomize what the subject is about. Phenix assigns the working out 
of the essential ideas of a discipline to specialists within each of 
the disciplines. 
He proposes that it is of critical importance that these ideas 
should be learnt from examples rather than be taught as explicit 
concepts. Thus it would be extreme foolishness to teach the logical 
distinction between fact and obligation as an explicit topic in 
elementary moral education. Just as foolish would be to begin a study 
of music in terms of the analytical concept of the musical idea. 
Instead, by carefully choosing the content of a subject, then 
slowly, individual item by individual item the jigsaw which is the 
essence of every discipline's representative ideas can be completed. 
By using the unusually illuminating specific example great economy and 
efficiency can be achieved in the art of communicating a discipline's 
core, and hence quickening a student's understanding and interest. 
112 
8. Methods of Enquiry  
Phenix's third principle in the selection of curriculum content 
is really a corollary of the principle of representative ideas. He 
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proposes that a discipline's distinct methods of enquiry constitutes 
an especially significant set of 'representative ideas'. 
He sees them as of central concern to the ameliorating of the 
main threats to meaning of cynicism, fragmentation, surfeit and 
transience. 
Firstly, he maintains an understanding of methods overcomes 
cynicism because it provides clear means for the acquisition of 
understanding. 
Secondly, he contends they are the unifying elements in a 
discipline and hence bind together the separate results of enquiry into 
one coherent domain. 
Thirdly they help solve the problem of surfeit in knowledge, 
since with the possession of the tools of enquiry one does not need 
a vast store of accumulated knowledge. 
Lastly, he believes they are especially helpful in respect to 
trainsience as the methods generally change much more slowly than do 
the results of their application. 
Taking an overview perhaps the most compelling reason for 
selecting the materials of instruction in order to exemplify methods 
of enquiry is that these methods are also the ways of learning. In 
being concerned with methods the student cannot assume a role of passibe 
recipient but is forced into a role of active participant and thus more 
quickly acquires the fundamental meanings of existence. 
9. The Appeal to Imagination  
Without the above it does not matter how efficient the selection 
of curriculum content has been, for without teaching which is 
imaginative the qualitative learning experience of the student is 
likely to be routine, uninspiring and ultimately creative of negative 
feelings to the subject. 
Thus there is a fourth important principle of content selection 
- appeal to the imagination. Phenix contends that the fundamental human 
motivation is the search for meaning. Imagination belongs to the active 
inner life of a person, and thus he feels that by constantly appealing 
to it, imaginative teaching has the power of fulfilling a person's 
existence. 
To achieve this he maintains three important principles must 
be remembered: 
(1) There is no unique model of imaginative teaching. A teacher has 
to take into account a whole range of social, cultural, age and 
environmental factors into . account to be 'imaginative' in a given 
situation. 
(2) The teacher himself must exemplify an imaginative quality of mind. 
(3) There must be unconditional faith in the possibility of realizing 
meaning through awakened imagination no matter what appearances 
may indicate to the contrary. 
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